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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE ENFORCEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE	  
Adiba	  A.	  Bark	  
Abstract 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are two very different 
approaches in dealing with settlement of disputes and conflicts. Both 
have their pros and cons, especially as far as the involvement of the 
United Nations is concerned. 
This thesis aimed to analyze the consequences of peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement involvement, militarily speaking, under the 
auspices of the United Nations. It aimed to prove that the United 
Nations should not resort to peace enforcement and should limit its 
intervention to peacekeeping because it is politically, militarily, and 
in terms of lack of resources, is unable to achieve the intended 
results in peace enforcement. The material and moral cost is 
therefore, high.  
This thesis started with the historical background of peacekeeping, 
followed by an extensive elaboration on the meaning, essence, 
objectives and evolvement of peacekeeping. Two case studies of 
UNIFIL and UNFICYP were introduced to match the realistic 
objectives of a peacekeeping mission with the ‘expected’ fulfillment, 
making both of them some of the longest running peacekeeping 
missions. 
The peace enforcement section, similarly, began with an elaboration 
of the concept, followed by two case studies, UNPROFOR and 
UNOSOM, both unsuccessful peace enforcement missions. 
Now, with the increasing calls for a military intervention of the 
United Nations, this thesis proved that the organization should 
refrain from such involvement. It was created on the grounds of 
peaceful settlement of disputes, non violence, and preservation of 
human rights. Any military enforcement will put its credibility in 
jeopardy. 
Keywords: Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, United Nations 
Charter, Security Council resolution, Chapter IV of UN Charter, 
Chapter VII of UN Charter, Principles of peacekeeping operations.  
	    
x	  
	  
Table of contents 
Chapter 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Page	  
I – Introduction 1 - 8 
 1.1 - Literature Review  8 
II - Historical Background 12 - 16 
III - Peacekeeping 17 - 35 
 3.1 - Understanding peacekeeping                                            17 
IV - Peacekeeping under international law: UN Charter  27 
 4.1 - Why is peacekeeping always linked with the UN?        27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.1.1- Articles 41 and 42                                     33 
 4.2 - Peacekeeping: Unilateral or collective?                          35 
V – DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING 37 - 40 
 5.1 - Peacekeeping and Intrastate Conflict                                    37 
VI – PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING 41- 52 
 6.1 - Consent of the Parties                                                       44 
 6.2 – Impartiality                                                                          46 
 6.3 - Non-use of force                                                    48 
VII - Limitations and Challenges of Peacekeeping        53 - 57 
VIII - Case Studies                                                            58 - 71 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.1-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus(UNFICYP)  58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.2 - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)    65 
xi	  
	  
IX - PEACE ENFORCEMENT 72 - 86 
 9.1 - Why the UN should not resort to Peace enforcement 75 
	   	  	  	  	  9.1.1 - Inexistence of appropriate structure              75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.1.2 -  Contradiction to the spirit of the UN              80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.1.3 - Lack of resources                                         84 
X – CASE STUDIES 87 - 93 
 10.1 – UNOSOM                                                             87 
 10.2 – UNPROFOR                                                          94 
XI - CONCLUSION 100 - 110 
Bibliography 111 
Appendix I 120                                                                                  
Appendix II 122                                                                                 
Appendix III 123                                                                                
Appendix IV 124                                                                                
 Appendix V                    129                                                                                                                   
	  
1	  
	  
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
	  
Sixty four years have passed since the creation of the United Nations, 
an organization aiming to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war and thus to maintain international peace and security, 
according to its Charter (United Nations [UN], 1954, preamble) 
Throughout those years, the United Nations has become renowned for 
peacekeeping, peace building, conflict prevention, and humanitarian 
assistance as its main activities to achieve the objective mentioned 
above (UN, n.d.).Although never explicitly mentioned in the UN 
Charter, “the blue helmets”1 did create a unique position within the 
United Nations’ history. Nevertheless, the fact that peacekeeping 
operations do not form an integral part of the UN Charter— and thus 
no guidelines, principles or rules have been anticipated— has put 
them under constant trial and error, which resulted in undeniable 
success in some cases and absolute fiascos in some others. 
Accordingly, the nature of peacekeeping operations has evolved over 
the years being heavily influenced by two major factors: the first is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  term	  ‘Blue	  Helmets’	  symbolically	  refers	  to	  UN	  peacekeepers	  due	  to	  the	  Blue	  Berets	  they	  wear.	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the shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts and multi-party civil 
wars. This became more significant following the end of the cold war, 
when new states emerged along ethnic lines while others dissolved 
into ethnic or racial conflicts. The second factor is the minimization of 
the Security Council paralysis following the cold war, thereby making 
it more effective. These factors have led to the evolvement of 
peacekeeping operations in their assigned tasks. In other words, they 
have expanded from observation missions and monitoring ceasefires, 
to humanitarian aid, formation and training of new armed forces, 
overseeing existing police forces, supervising existing administrations 
and even conducting elections.  
In light of the current events in the Arab world that broke out in early 
2011, what has become commonly known as the ‘Arab Spring’ has 
imposed new realities both on the regional and international levels. 
There have been several calls for the interference of the UN and its 
involvement in a form of military actions in the internal issues.  
The UN’s response varied from condemnation, to economic sanctions, 
to paving the way for military intervention; NATO in Libya. It is a 
complex political discussion to assess the variance in UN’s response to 
the revolutions in the Arab world. But it could be briefly said that the 
UN cannot and should not get involved militarily in such events, but 
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rather to send observers, provide good offices or other mediation 
support for several reasons that will be further explored later. 
In light of the above and most peacekeeping operations implemented 
since 1948, and out of the belief that the difference between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement lies in the way peace is being 
approached; this thesis attempts to argue that it is better for the 
United Nations to refrain from getting involved in peace enforcement 
actions, militarily speaking, and focus more on peacekeeping because 
it has neither the political nor the military capability to do so. 
Although peacekeeping operations had modest objectives, most of 
them managed to keep the peace to a certain extent, and lessened 
the probability of outbreak of wars, thus eventually met the 
expectations listed in the resolutions, whereas peace enforcement 
operations in most cases failed to do so. First, enforcement measures, 
in the military sense of action, always hold a great of risk of civilian 
casualties, material loss, and violations of human rights. Second, 
enforcing peace requires a solid political will that is rarely obtained in 
the Security Council, and if obtained, can be withdrawn at any point 
when calculations shift, like the US’ withdrawal from Somalia. In such 
situations, the consequences can be devastating. Third, enforcing 
peace, militarily speaking, requires a well-trained and well equipped 
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‘army’, with a very clear chain of command. Yet, the UN lacks all as 
mentioned earlier and as will be further explored in this thesis. 
Added to this, is the difficulty in securing the political will needed for 
any coercive measures or enforcement due to the conflicting interests 
of the states, be them members of the Security Council or the 
international community in general. It could also be said that a peace 
enforcement mission, in the form of military action, need the technical 
support of a super power to be able to succeed, namely the U.S. Yet, 
this is risked by bringing the United Nations under the mercy of the 
U.S., or any other major power, and thus in acting in a biased 
manner. Finally, and most importantly, peace enforcement use of 
violence falls outside the spirit of the UN Charter and mission. 
A highlight is worth being shed here on the difference between 
collective security and peace enforcement. While the two concepts 
might be used in describing the same cases,   Collective security 
being “a type of coalition building strategy in which a group of nations 
agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an 
attack from one of the others, if such an attack is made.  The 
principal is that "an attack against one, is an attack against all." It 
differs from "collective defense" which is a coalition of nations which 
agree to defend its own group against outside attacks.  Thus NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact were examples of collective defense, while the 
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UN is an attempt at collective security.” While peace enforcement is 
one of the tools of collective Security, had it been economic sanctions, 
air or water embargo, or military intervention, used to coerce a party 
to comply with the international rules of peace and security (Conflict 
Research Consortium, n.d.). 
Collective Security could be criticized in that it applies to small states 
only. It is difficult to imagine that a collective security measure is 
taken against a major power, apart from the issue of veto. While in 
fact the wars involving major powers inflict more danger on 
international peace and security than wars involving small states 
(Thakur and Schnabel, 2001) 
The importance of this thesis lies in its comprehensive comparative 
assessment of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement on theoretical 
and practical levels, using relevant examples. To pursue such a 
comprehensive assessment, several types of peacekeeping operations 
will be explored, namely traditional peacekeeping and expanded 
peacekeeping. Moreover, this work highlights the common general 
guidelines that define peacekeeping operations, while also providing 
the political, military, and international context of the peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement missions will be discussed. 
6	  
	  
There are no clear cut differences between observation, peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement actions. There are always grey areas in which 
one function amalgamates into another. A Leroy Bennett, 
differentiates between peacekeeping and “Collective Security” in 
aspects pertaining to the objectives, and use of force. He explains 
that peacekeeping and collective security are two different processes 
although both may involve the deployment of military forces. Yet, 
peacekeeping do not aim to defeat an aggressor; its scope of work to 
resemble that of the police than that of the military (Bennett & Oliver, 
2002). In other words, peacekeeping forces are required to maintain 
ceasefire, to act as a buffer and thus are allowed to use their weapons 
for self-defense only. Furthermore, peacekeeping, unlike collective 
security, is to be isolated and segregated from the influence, direct 
involvement of major powers (Bennet & Oliver, 2002). In fact, the 
Somali and Bosnian cases, explained later in this thesis, will 
demonstrate the vagueness of the transition from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement as well as its complications and nuances.  
It should be noted here that the use of the term peace enforcement is 
in reference to military enforcement, as opposed to economic or any 
other type of enforcement. Also, the term peacekeeping includes the 
traditional peacekeeping along with its wider peacekeeping aspects; in 
other words, peacekeeping missions can involve humanitarian aid and 
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different forms of peacemaking and state building tasks. This wider 
meaning of the term is important  in order to assess recent 
peacekeeping missions; otherwise, the only traditional peacekeeping 
missions that are primarily military representations of observing 
ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars are those of 
the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This research briefly elucidates the 
disparities between traditional peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping.  
This thesis will prove the hypothesis through a comparative approach 
by comparing between peacekeeping missions and peace enforcement 
missions. Since the UN has authorized a large number of cases, 
however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to study all of them. 
This thesis will only look into the most important cases with a focus 
on two peace keeping cases: The United Nations Peacekeeping force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), and two peace enforcement cases, Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and 
Somalia (UNOSOM). 
These four cases were selected based on their recency and on being 
representative samples of successful peacekeeping and unsuccessful 
peace enforcement. 
The assessment of peace enforcement cases varies based on whether 
they were debacles, whether they included aspects of success, and 
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whether the assessment is made in terms of objectives fulfillment, 
human casualties, or material loss. Although these cases have a 
relatively good range of literature coverage like Ray Murhy’s book on 
UNIFIL, UNITAD and UNOSOM or Lamis Andoni’s analysis on UNIFIL, 
or even Robert Allen’s contribution on Somalia for example, yet they 
are not extensively covered when it comes to an assessment of peace 
keeping versus peace enforcement. 
The United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will be 
examined here to exemplify successful peacekeeping where the 
objectives set by the mandate were achieved without resorting to 
force. The UNFICYP and UNIFIL are actually interesting cases because 
they have kept the traditional peacekeeping while adding a wider 
peacekeeping aspect. More so, they are ongoing missions until this 
day; consequently, little research has been done following the late 
1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. 
Bosnia and Somalia represent failed cases of peace enforcement. 
UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia demonstrates ensuing 
failure when peacekeepers are put in a position of peace enforcement. 
1.1. Literature Review 
With tens of peacekeeping operations achieved until this day, various 
assessments have been conducted on the performance of 
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peacekeeping operations indicating some as examples of success, and 
others as unmistakable failures. Some of the most prominent and 
comprehensive assessments done are Boutros Boutros Ghali’s “An 
Agenda for Peace” 1994 and Lakhdar Brahimi report in 2000 which 
provided the milestones for reforming peacekeeping operations. 
Brahimi’s (who is a UN envoy and advisor and has held several 
significant positions in the UN)Report has briefly tackled the issue of 
peace enforcement, though not in details, he tends to be in favor of 
going more into peace enforcement though not necessarily through 
the UN. George Oliver, Chief of Staff to the US Delegation to the UN 
Military Staff Committee, and Military Advisor to the US Permanent 
Representative to the UN, expresses similar point of view. Jane 
Boulden, who holds a Canada Research Chair (CRC) in International 
Relations and Security Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, 
realizes in her book “Peace enforcement: the United Nations 
Experience in Somalia and Bosnia” the dangers and risks that peace 
enforcement missions may impose on the UN mainly. In fact, she 
assumes that with peace enforcement there is a high risk of failure 
(Boulden, 2005). Katharina Coleman, an assistant professor who 
holds a PhD. From Princeton University, on the other hand, tackles 
peace enforcement in as far as the implementing organization is 
concerned. She argues in her book “International Organizations and 
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peace enforcement: the politics of international legitimacy” that 
having an international organization taking over a peace enforcement 
mission actually provides the legitimacy for such missions. Other 
scholars like Trevor Findlay, Director of the Canadian Centre for 
Treaty Compliance (CCTC) and holds the William and Jeanie Barton 
Chair in International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of 
International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University in Ottawa, in “The 
use of Force in UN peace operations” (Findlay, 2002) and Ramesh 
Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel in “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement” go more into 
description by classifying peace enforcement within several 
generations of peacekeeping (Thakur &Schnabel, 2001). 
The importance this thesis, in light of the above mentioned and other 
literature, is that it provides a constructive analysis on peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement. This is being achieved by gradually moving 
from the basic concepts to the more complicated grey areas 
combining the two. It also provides an analysis of the relevant case 
studies, without ignoring some successful cases of peace enforcement 
for instance, but with a cautious, analytical justification in an attempt 
to cover objectively the entire aspects and factors.  
11	  
	  
This thesis will begin by providing a short historical background on 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This chapter will be followed by 
demonstrating theoretically that the UN can continue being involved 
in peacekeeping missions. This theoretical chapter will be followed by 
studying two peacekeeping case studies. The same framework will be 
applied to the peace enforcement section. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
	  
From the several reviews and studies that examine peacekeeping 
operations, very few have tackled its history prior to the creation of 
the United Nations.  With those studies that have analyzed pre-UN 
peace keeping operations, there has been the constant challenge of 
determining the starting point of what is termed “peacekeeping 
operations”. The official point of view of the United Nations considers 
that peacekeeping operations have begun with United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO)(O’Neill & Rees, 2005) sent to 
Palestine in 1948. UNTSO was created by Security Council resolution 
50 (1948) although not formally as a peacekeeping force since the 
resolution never mentioned the mission by name (Nachmias, 1996). 
The Security Council called for a termination of fighting and decided to 
send observers to supervise the Armistice Agreement between Israel 
and the surrounding Arab countries. Consequently, the force was sent 
to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise the negotiated truce by Count 
Bernadotte. During that time, the British sponsored the resolution 
above to ensure compliance by both sides through sending a sufficient 
number of military observers. As a result, UNTSO was formed of sixty 
three unarmed officer observers provided by Belgium, France, 
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Sweden and the United States (MacQueen, 2006). UNTSO is still 
functioning till this day, which makes it the UN’s longest running 
mission (Sinai, 1995). According to the Armistice Agreement, its 
mandate is limited to observing, reporting, and investigating cease-
fire violations, did not include any enforcement aspect in its operation 
(Nachmias, 1996). 
Today, UNTSO encompasses 151 military observers, supported by 88 
international civilian personnel and 123 local civilian staff. It is still 
operating within the framework of observance and supervision but has 
geographically expanded to include Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization [UNTSO]).  
However, most scholars consider the first peacekeeping operation to 
be the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was 
deployed in the Middle East between 1956 - 1967 following the 1956 
war between Egypt and Israel. UNEF I was the first armed United 
Nations operation, which introduced a different type of peacekeeping, 
that is, a peacekeeping force. UNEF I laid the basis and guidelines for 
the peacekeeping operations that followed. It was because of UNEF I 
that the principles of impartiality, consent of the parties, and the 
minimum use of force (for self-defense) were adopted in the 
forthcoming peacekeeping operations. It is the corner stone for 
understanding peacekeeping operations, their history and evolution.   
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During the 1960s, six peacekeeping operations took place, three of 
which are significant. One was the UN peacekeeping force in Congo 
(ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 to decolonize the Congo from 
Belgium. Many categorize it as peace enforcement rather than 
peacekeeping seeing that it actually established a development in 
peacekeeping tasks by introducing the enforcement aspect. However, 
this trend was stopped for the following almost two decades. The 
other significant peacekeeping operation was (and still is) in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP),which intended to end the conflict between the Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots over the island. The third significant 
peacekeeping operation in the 1960s was UNIPOM, which saught to 
monitor and consolidate a cease fire, following the end of the Indo-
Pakistani war in 1965, along the international borders between India 
and Pakistan. 
The 1970s marked the focus on the Middle East par excellence; three 
peacekeeping operations were established, all of which were located 
in the Middle East, and two of them remain until this day. The first 
one is the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) following 
the October 1973 war between the Arab states, mainly Egypt and 
Syria, and Israel, which lasted from October 1973 to July 1979.The 
second peacekeeping operation was the UN Disengagement Observer 
Force (UNDOF), which was established in 1974, following the 1973 
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war, to supervise the implementation of the truce on the Golan 
Heights that followed the agreed disengagement of the “Israeli” and 
Syrian forces. The Last peacekeeping mission established in the 1970s 
was the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) created in 1978 
following the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. Initially, UNIFIL 
was intended to verify the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in addition 
to helping the Lebanese government restore its authority in the area. 
However, between 1978 and 2005 UNIFIL’s mandate expanded to 
cover more aspects and following the 2006 war the Security Council 
expanded its tasks even more to include aspects of humanitarian 
relief and support for the community. 
It’s important to note here that during the cold war, it was difficult to 
establish peacekeeping missions due to the paralysis and lack of 
consensus in the Security Council, especially in the areas that were 
considered related to the struggle between the US and USSR. 
Accordingly, few conflicts gained the support of the Security Council 
to establish peacekeeping operations. During the 1980s, five 
peacekeeping operations were established, some of which were in 
Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iraq-Iran, Angola, and Central America.  
Whereas during the 1990s, following the end of the cold war, the 
breakdown of states, the creation of new ones, and the increase in 
civil wars, thirty five missions were established, two of which are still 
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present: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) (United Nations[UN]). The scale of these missions 
varied considerably based on the circumstances. It was mostly in the 
1990s that peacekeeping started developing, introducing new tasks of 
humanitarian relief, state building and other similar undertakings.  
From 2000 to 2010, eleven peacekeeping missions were established, 
seven of which are still present, mainly in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, 
Sudan, Timor-Leste, Darfur, and Congo2.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  more	  info	  on	  the	  current	  peacekeeping	  operations	  you	  can	  visit:	  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml	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CHAPTER THREE 
PEACEKEEPING	  
	  
“Arguably the most important innovation in conflict management in 
the last fifty years is the practice of peacekeeping: the concept of 
sending personnel from the international community to help keep 
peace in the aftermath of war.”(Fortna, 2003) 
3.1 Understanding peacekeeping 
	  
Since 1948, sixty-three peacekeeping operations have taken place, 
sixteen of which are still in operation. A Hundred and seventeen 
countries have contributed either financially or in personnel. A total of 
113,376 personnel are currently serving in the sixteen peacekeeping 
operations, with a cost of fifty four billion since 1948 (Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO], n.d.). Although all has been 
developed by the United Nations, there is no agreed definition for 
peacekeeping (Goulding, 1993) since it is not mentioned anywhere in 
the Charter. In addition, the functions of peacekeeping missions have 
shifted dramatically from interposition between states in demilitarized 
buffer zones to more complex operations that involve new tasks like 
humanitarian assistance, support in transitioning through elections, 
and civil administration, among others, which further complicated the 
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endeavor to define peacekeeping(Sitkowski, 2006).Nonetheless, 
several attempts at defining peacekeeping are documented. 
One of the attempts to define peacekeeping is that of the 
International Peace Academy, quoted in Denis Jett’s book ‘why 
peacekeeping fails’, where he defines the role of peacekeeping as “the 
prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities 
between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third 
party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a 
multinational force of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and 
maintain peace.”(Jett, 2001).This definition provides a general 
description of a peacekeeping operation regardless of the umbrella 
under which it is legitimized. Alternatively, Marrack Goulding and 
Boutros Boutros Ghali directly associate peacekeeping with the United 
Nations, thereby defining peacekeeping within the context of the 
functions and obligations of the United Nations, which, in itself 
provides a clearer foundation to start from. Goulding defines 
peacekeeping operations within the lines of the United Nations, “Field 
operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the 
parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, 
under the United Nations command and control, at the expense 
collectively of the member states”. His definition also includes the 
acknowledged general principles of peacekeeping, voluntarism in 
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contribution, impartiality, and minimum use of force (Goulding, 
1993). Boutros Boutros Ghali shares his definition of peacekeeping 
operations in his 1992 report “An agenda for Peace”: “peacekeeping is 
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United 
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as 
well, peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for 
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Ghali, 
1992). Both definitions facilitate a better understanding of the nature 
of peace enforcement (or actually the shift from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement) in Somalia and Bosnia, where the pillars of the 
consent of the parties, impartiality, and the minimum use of force 
became absent leading to destructive consequences that will be 
further discussed later. 
Although Brahimi led an extensive assessment and evaluation of the 
peacekeeping operations, he did not provide a comprehensive 
definition, probably leaving space for the flexibility that peacekeeping 
operations remarkably enjoy. He, thus, refers to peacekeeping 
operations merely as “a 50–year-old enterprise that has evolved 
rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model 
of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars, to 
incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, 
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working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil 
wars.” (Brahimi, 2000) 
Of all the previous definitions, one stands out, that is, the 
International Peace Academy’s definition, since it is the most 
comprehensive. In other words, it includes the different stages of 
peacekeeping, the fact that peacekeeping can be between or within 
states, that it is an international intervention composed of 
international police and civilians, and that its aim is to maintain 
peace. Therefore, it fits several types of peacekeeping operations 
under various circumstances and umbrellas. However, since this paper 
focuses mainly on the United Nations peacekeeping operations, it is 
natural to include the UN’s definition. Yet, the UN’s corner stone 
document on peacekeeping “United Nations Peacekeeping operations: 
Principles and Guidelines” clearly indicates that “Official United 
Nations definitions are being considered in the context of the ongoing 
terminology deliberations of the General Assembly’s Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the basis of the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Interim Glossary of Terms” 
(DPKO, 2008).  Nevertheless, Findlay indicates the UN’s definition to 
be, “missions involving military personnel, but without enforcement 
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore 
international peace and security in areas of conflict” (Findlay, 2002). 
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While this definition seems to be elastic, the UN has been hesitant to 
further elucidate peacekeeping since defining it may impose a 
straitjacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most practical 
tool at the disposal of the UN (Findlay, 2002). 
However, understanding peacekeeping in relation to peace 
enforcement necessarily entails understanding the various types of 
peacekeeping operations. Most scholarly articles, many were used in 
this thesis, classify peacekeeping operations as traditional 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, expanded peacekeeping, first, 
second, third (or more) generations of peacekeeping operations and 
other classifications. This goes back to the evolvement of 
peacekeeping with new tasks entering the realm, leading to the 
invention of new terminologies to differentiate among the various 
emergent types. Accordingly, it is essential to fully comprehend the 
various types of peacekeeping in order to be able to clearly 
differentiate between peacekeeping operations and peace 
enforcement and hence be able to better assess the successes and 
failures of the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the 
peace enforcement operations of Somalia and Bosnia.  
The first, and most significant, type of peacekeeping is the “traditional 
peacekeeping”, which marks the majority of early peacekeeping 
missions, especially in the period preceding the Cold War. It also 
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constitutes the starting point from which the new types emanated. 
Thus, traditional peacekeeping is categorized by some scholars, like 
Thakur and Schnabel, as “first generation” of peacekeeping operations 
(Thakur &Schnabel, 2001). An ideal example of traditional 
peacekeeping is the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 
the late 1950s and in fact, almost all of the peacekeeping missions 
that took place in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.   
Findlay refers to UN peace operations as “involving the deployment of 
military contingents to monitor, supervise and verify compliance to 
ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals buffer zones and related 
military agreements” (Findlay, 2002).Yet the definition fails to cover 
vital elements of traditional peacekeeping; they had no military 
objectives, were not involved in active combat, were located between 
hostile parties rather than in opposition, and finally that their function 
was to negotiate rather than to fight (Thakur &Schnabel, 2001).  This is 
not to mention the mandatory requirements, or the ‘holy trinity’ as 
Bellamy calls them, which are, the consent of the parties involved, 
impartiality and the minimum use of force— in cases of self-defense 
(Bellamy, Williams & Griffins, 2004).  
Moreover, traditional peacekeeping operations are intended to create 
the conducive conditions to assist the conflicting parties in reaching a 
long term resolution by themselves or with the support of 
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international mediation; therefore, it usually takes place in the phase 
between a political settlement and a ceasefire (Bellamy, Williams & 
Griffins, 2004).  Accordingly, it stands on three main assumptions: 
first is that the aggressors are states, second is that the fighting units 
are hierarchically organized, and third is that the protagonists actually 
have the intention of ending the conflict and seek a political resolution 
(Bellamy, Williams & Griffins, 2004).Briefly, the term ‘peacekeeping 
operations’ encompasses the military and civilian personnel positioned 
under a peacekeeping mandate (Osman, 2002) 
Following the end of the Cold War, new realities were imposed on the 
international arena, namely, civil wars, the dissolution and creation of 
new states and systems, and the cessation of the polarization that 
was paralyzing the Security Council. With these new challenges, the 
UN had to respond quickly; but this time, the nature of the conflicts 
inflicted major modifications that would be incorporated into 
peacekeeping operations. Consequently, additional responsibilities and 
tasks were added to the spectrum of functions of peacekeeping 
operations.   
Scholars like Bellamy, Thakur, and Goulding, although agreed on the 
principle of the expanded nature of peacekeeping operations, they, 
sometimes, disagreed on the terminology to use. For instance, a new 
type of peacekeeping that emerged following the Cold War, and 
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specifically in the early 1990s, was “expanded peacekeeping” which 
involved tasks like re-establishing democratic and accountable 
governance, promoting the development of civil society, resettling 
refugees, providing humanitarian aid and relief, like in Somalia and 
Bosnia, organizing elections, providing the thrust for economic 
development and reconstruction, and even nation building. Bellamy 
for instance, refers to similar operations as “managing transition” 
since, according to Bellamy (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004), they 
manage the transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace by 
providing the supporting grounds.  This is also because they have a 
clear beginning, which starts with the signature of the political 
settlement with the call for a managing transition operation, and a 
clear ending marked by the completion of the mission, which in turn is 
characterized by the holding of free and fair elections or the 
recognition of the new state’s independence. UNTEA (United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority) in Indonesia, UNTAG in Namibia, 
ONUSAL in El Salvador and UNTAC in Cambodia represent such cases 
although they will not be further discussed since they fall out of the 
context of this paper (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004). 
Several other terminologies like wider peacekeeping, second 
generation of peacekeeping, type three and four refer basically to the 
same nature of expanded tasks of peacekeeping operations following 
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traditional peacekeeping. While they may include minor differences in 
classification, they refer to the same framework of the UN Charter 
which is Chapter VI or “Chapter VI and a half” (“Honoring 60 years of 
UN”, n.d.). 
Indar Rikhye, who was the military advisor to the United Nations 
Secretaries General Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant in the 1960s, 
focuses on three key roles that signify the value of peacekeeping 
operations: first is that during the Cold War, peacekeeping provided 
the means for resolving conflicts without the direct involvement of the 
super powers of the Cold War; thereby minimizing the risk of 
catastrophic escalation. This was no longer valid following the Cold 
War when the US did get directly involved in Somalia and Bosnia. It 
actually took over at some point and then, due to circumstances that 
will be described later, had to withdraw leaving a tragic situation 
behind. Second, peacekeeping operations assisted in rallying an 
international community that would make a commitment to maintain 
peace.  
Rikhye, however, doesn’t identify the nature of the commitment, 
whether it is moral or material, though both may be fallacious. In 
other words, a moral commitment towards maintaining peace is 
implicit once a country is admitted to the UN; therefore, it’s not the 
establishment of peacekeeping operations that creates that 
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commitment. Furthermore, many major powers, especially European, 
refrained from providing military personnel and equipment due to 
political calculations or interests and sometimes even fell behind in 
paying their dues. Rikhye’s final point, and probably the most 
important, is that he considers peacekeeping to be a diplomatic key to 
pave the way for further negotiations among parties of the conflict in 
order to resolve the conflict peacefully (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 
2004).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Peacekeeping under international law: 
UN Charter 
	  
4.1 Why is peacekeeping always linked with the UN? 
	  
Whenever discussing peacekeeping, the very first image that usually 
comes to mind is the blue helmet soldier with the white UN initials 
written on the front of the helmet. Why do most people tend to 
identify peacekeeping with the United Nations? Ghali summarizes the 
relation between peacekeeping operations and the UN when he states 
that “Peacekeeping can rightly be called the invention of the United 
Nations” (Ghali, 1992). 
On the other hand, scholars offer several analyses on this matter. One 
of the reasoning offered is the loaded history of the UN in its role in 
international conflicts. Following the high risks of the enforcement-
based collective security in the charter, that was a very risky 
ambitious plan. Therefore, peacekeeping “emerged to fill the 
embarrassing gap left when the more robust forms of intervention 
proved inapplicable to the polarized international system of the cold 
war.” (MacQueen, 2006) 
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Moreover, UN is always associated with peacekeeping operations 
simply because the UN was in fact present in most of them. This was 
due to the organization’s claim to legal supremacy in matters of world 
peace and security since the Charter had been deliberately designed 
to place the United Nations above all other institutional actors, 
thereby providing it with the necessary coercive powers to assist it in 
maintaining this position (MacQueen, 2006). Goulding, however,  
argues that the reason behind the “United Nationsness” of 
peacekeeping operations is that they were established by one of the 
legislative organs of the United Nations in the sense that they were 
commanded and controlled by the Secretary General who has the 
authority vested in him by the Security Council to which he reports 
regularly.  In addition, peacekeeping operations are financed 
collectively by UN member states as “expenses of the organization” 
under article 17 of the Charter. Moreover, UN peacekeeping 
operations are the most popular because of their “United 
Nationsness”, which has made them acceptable to member states to 
allow foreign troops on their territory. Had it not been under the UN, 
any foreign troop would remain subject to suspicions that it is acting 
as a tool of its government. This would severely damage the 
credibility of an operation (Goulding, 1993) 
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“The UN system is a legal order itself, since it frames and epitomizes 
universal values and principles and at the same time it produces law 
that defends, implements, and enforces the former” (Sarigiannidis, 
2007).Accordingly, the Charter of the UN illustrates one of the most 
significant lawmaking documents, in addition to the resolutions that 
reflect the spirit of the UN and the international principles and values 
that the UN represents. Yet the UN is known to have always suffered 
from the lack of coercive or enforcement measures that could 
guarantee compliance with the laws produced by the Security Council 
and the General Assembly. Consequently, peacekeeping operations 
introduced a new dynamic and a means to insure a certain degree of 
conformity with the international standards or decisions set by the UN 
(Sarigiannidis, 2007).	  
The Charter provides legitimacy to resolutions and the mandates it 
authorizes, though, as mentioned previously, and most importantly, it 
never explicitly mentions peacekeeping operations or even refers to it 
in any special provision. Accordingly, the legal ground for each 
operation is the mandate given to it. The Security Council decides the 
limitations of the operation when it determines its mandate (Jett, 
2001). 
This leads us to the understanding that the body of principles and 
procedures regulating peacekeeping operations has been founded 
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through a gradual evolution over the years by the established 
operations. These operations are mainly the 13 operations created 
during the cold war, all of which provided a set of practices, thereby 
creating customs that became internationally recognizable and 
acceptable. Consequently, we may say that peacekeeping operations 
fall mainly under customary law since they are not referred to in 
treaties and since the legality and legitimacy of peacekeeping 
practices are weighed in comparison with previous cases (Goulding, 
1993), keeping in mind that this also applies to peace enforcement 
missions.  
Nevertheless, when referring to the Charter of the United Nations, a 
peacekeeping operation derives its legality and legitimacy from 
Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (Action 
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts 
of Aggression) (Sitkowski, 2006). Nevertheless, it has become 
“commonly known” to refer to peacekeeping operations as ‘Chapter 
six and a half’, which is a term invented by UN Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjold (United Nations Information Service, n.d.). The term 
indicates that they fall between the traditional means of peacefully 
resolving disputes, like negotiations under Chapter VI, and the more 
forceful measures authorized under Chapter VII. In other words, on 
the one hand, peacekeeping forms an actual military presence, and 
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therefore, does not only consist of basic fact finding missions or mere 
recommendations for conflict resolution as provided in Chapter VI. On 
the other hand, it is also not a pure military enforcement as provided 
in Chapter VII (as cited in O’Neill & Rees, 2005). 
Furthermore, the Security Council is the UN body that is mainly 
responsible for designing and establishing peacekeeping operations 
when matters relating to international peace and security are brought 
to its attention by the Secretary General, the General Assembly, 
and/or individual members of the Security Council. The Security 
Council then designs the mandate of the operation, which is 
influenced by the nature and substance of the agreement reached by 
the parties to the conflict (DPKO, 2008). Some scholars argue that 
when the Security Council determines the breach of peace, the way is 
open, at least on the legal level, for it to decide on enforcement 
measures (Osman, 2002). However, the Security Council rarely 
mentions a specific chapter under which the mandate is authorized. It 
has never invoked Chapter VI for instance (DPKO, 2008).In fact, the 
Security Council does not need to refer to a particular Chapter of the 
Charter when passing a resolution approving the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation. But the conviction has been that 
peacekeeping operations are authorized under Chapter VI of the 
charter whose decisions are known to be recommendatory and not 
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enforceable. Hence, a peacekeeping operation authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VI normally requires having the 
consent of the parties involved in the conflict in order to be deployed.  
As far as the use of force is concerned, it is assumed to be limited to 
self-defense under Chapter VI. The use of force beyond the scope of 
self-defense may be resorted to only with the consent of the parties, 
which is unlikely to happen since this would imply authorizing using 
force against themselves (Findlay, 2002). Accordingly, and though a 
clear difference exists between peacekeeping and peace enforcing— 
which will be further explained later in this paper— the two terms are 
sometimes mistakenly used in describing the same cases. 
Peacekeeping is thus associated with Chapter VI, whereas using 
military force by the UN for enforcement purposes  draws its legality 
form Chapter VII, which gives the Security Council’s decisions the 
enforceable nature such as  imposing economic sanctions and taking 
military action. Therefore, under chapter VII, an operation may use 
force beyond self-defense for enforcement, which in turn is considered 
to be illegal had the operation been mandated under chapter VI. This 
was also confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 
1962 when it ruled that “while the UN has an inherent capacity to 
establish, assume, command over and employ military forces, these 
may only exercise ‘belligerent rights’ when authorized to do so by the 
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Security Council acting under Chapter VII” (Findlay, 
2002).Nonetheless, it remains crucial to note here, as far as 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement are concerned,  the “use of 
force” is never specifically mentioned in a Security Council’s 
resolution. They refrain from indicating in advance the suitable level 
of force to be used. They usually mandate a mission “to use all means 
necessary” to carry out the mandate (Findlay, 2002). 
4.1.1. Articles 41 and 42: 
	  
Articles 41 and 42 directly relate to forceful military and non-military 
responses. Article 41 states the following: 
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.” (UN Charter, n.d.) 
 
Article 42, on the other hand, states:  
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.” (UN charter, n.d.) 
 
 
Clearly enough, a military measure is to be taken following the proven 
failure of the ‘non-military’ enforcement measures. However, the 
application of such measures implies that the aggressors are states 
the Security Council expanded such threats to include a rebellion in 
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South Rhodesia (1965) and a nuclear weapons program in South 
Africa (1977) as threats to international peace and security. 
Moreover, following the 1991 Gulf War, new types of threats to 
international peace and security were introduced by the Security 
Council like the flow of Kurdish refugees (resolution 688), the collapse 
of the state  in Somalia, the massive abuse of human rights in 
Kosovo, the overthrow of a democratically elected government in 
Haiti, and international terrorism in resolution 1373 (Bellamy, Williams 
& Griffin, 2004).However, Article 42 remained inactive during the cold 
war period due, to the UN’s catastrophic first experience in interstate 
peace enforcement in the Congo (1960 – 1964) on the one hand, and 
due to the Security Council paralysis which put off any further 
experimentation (Coleman, 2007), on the other hand. The 
authorization of enforcement measures requires an affirmative vote of 
nine members of the Security Council, including the five permanent 
members; and of course, it also requires the Security Council to 
identify what forms a threat to international peace and security.  
Ghali differentiates between Article 40 and Article 42 by clearly stating 
that peace enforcement, being more heavily armed, is constitutionally 
based on Article 40 rather than Article 42 of Chapter VII (as cited in 
Osman, 2002). 
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Furthermore, it is essential to bear in mind the political factor 
constantly present in the process of designing the Security Council 
resolutions. Accordingly, and in order to maximize political support, 
mandates can turn out to be vague, and at the time of 
implementation, a considerable space will surface for disagreement on 
defining the purposes and the best ways to go about achieving them 
(Druckman et al., 1997).  
4.2 Peacekeeping: Unilateral or collective? 
	  
It should be stated here that one of the important advantages of 
peacekeeping is that it doesn’t have to fall under the mercy of one 
state, namely a major power as is the case of military enforcement. It 
doesn’t require a high scale significant and sophisticated equipment 
that could only be supplied by a super power since it doesn’t involve 
coercive measures, while such a privilege could not be available for a 
peace enforcement mission.  
Hence, it is difficult to conceive a unilateral activity as peacekeeping 
and vice versa. Consequently, is it adequate to consider an ad hoc 
multilateral intervention of a group of states as a peacekeeping force? 
Or does peacekeeping have to function within the framework of an 
institutionalized international organization? 
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Previously, various peacekeeping schemes have taken place through 
‘coalitions of the willing ‘without formally referring to any international 
organization (MacQueen, 2006). However, it is often regarded as a 
second option since it emerges following the failure of attempts to 
establish a peacekeeping force within an international organization 
(MacQueen, 2006). As a result, there is no rule or law stating that 
peacekeeping should be affiliated with and form of regional or 
international organizations; however, it is clearly comprehended and 
expected that any unilateral peacekeeping initiative will remain 
subject to accusations of having hidden agendas and hidden 
intentions and motives (MacQueen, 2006) that they intend to achieve 
through the peacekeeping mission. 
On the other hand, having a collective acceptance and support by 
middle range and neutral powers is sufficient for peacekeeping 
missions; as opposed to peace enforcement missions which more 
likely to be ‘successful’ with the support of major powers.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Development of Peacekeeping 
	  
It has been previously mentioned in this paper that several factors 
have contributed to the evolvement of peacekeeping operations, most 
significantly, the end of the Cold War, the decrease of interstate wars 
and the upsurge of civil wars, and globalization. Understanding these 
factors will help to better comprehend the status of peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations today and potentially to predict their 
future. 
5.1 Peacekeeping and Intrastate Conflict 
	  
Globalization has deeply affected the international political process; 
new factors stepped into the fore while others moved into the 
background. For instance, non-state actors have gained significant 
weight on the international arena and sometimes over weighed state 
actors,  indicating that states are no longer at the heart of global 
politics and international relations. Such a shift from ‘Westphalian to 
post-Westphalian’ order (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004) has 
significantly affected peacekeeping operations, having traditional 
peacekeeping mainly associated with the ‘Westphalian order’, while 
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the other types of peacekeeping operations associated with the ‘post-
Westphalian order’3.  
Basically, at the time of the inception of the United Nations, the only 
type of relationship foreseen by the authors was that between states 
as sole actors. Even prior to the creation of the United Nations, the 
laws that governed relations between states were those derived from 
treaties and customs created by the states themselves, and no other 
entity. Nevertheless, an international entity like the UN has 
introduced a new approach, where the decision of going to war is no 
longer vested in the hands of the states, who, by admitting to the UN, 
have more or less given up this right in favor of collective security, 
thereby, giving up part of their sovereignty (Sarigiannidis, 2007). 
Self-defense became the only viable option. This has also played a 
role in reshaping the “Westphalian” concept, in as far as minimizing 
the role of states— by giving up part of their sovereignty— is 
concerned.   
Peacekeeping operations fall within the same context of giving up part 
of a state’s sovereignty in favor of a third actor outside its entity. In 
this case, it will be moving from the Westphalian to the post-
Westphalian phase. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Westphalian	  order	  refers	  to	  the	  Westphalia	  treaty	  signed	  in	  1648	  which	  ended	  the	  Thirty	  Years’	  War	  
between	  Spain	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.	  The	  term	  now	  refers	  to	  the	  nation	  state	  sovereignty,	  respect	  of	  
territorial	  integrity,	  non-­‐intervention	  of	  one	  state	  in	  the	  internal	  matters	  of	  other	  states.	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States and scholars differ in their perception of Westphalian 
peacekeeping in comparison with post-Westphalian peacekeeping. 
Russia, China and India, for instance, favor the Westphalian 
conception and accordingly view the role of peacekeeping operations 
as merely to provide the space and structure for sovereigns to resolve 
their disagreements peacefully. Based on this, the UN is expected to 
not interfere in matters that are considered internal or domestic and 
should only act upon the consent of the sovereigns. While other 
states, mainly western, believe that the UN should be involved in 
building democratic societies in places torn by war; believing that  
more democratic systems means  less wars. This necessarily implies 
giving up some of their sovereignty, thus, moving towards the Post-
Westphalian concept (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004), which gives 
more space and legitimacy to peace enforcement. Yet the nature of 
conflicts, following the Cold War, annulled the Russian, Chinese and 
Indian perceptions. Having civil wars no longer involves sovereigns, 
rather non-state actors like warlords and militias. Cases of Somalia’s 
warlords illustrate such new developments.  
Moreover, involvement in civil wars turned out to be exceptionally 
difficult since it is hard for belligerents in civil wars to achieve an 
armistice under which they retreat to the opposite sides of the 
ceasefire line as there are no clear boundaries that separate them. 
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This also keeps the soldiers with the constant possibility of coming 
into contact with their civilian victims or their former enemies.  
Consequently, reconciliation becomes a daily task and even harder to 
achieve (Fortna, 2003). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Principles of peacekeeping operations 
	  
Having clear set principles of peacekeeping, which are not available to 
peace enforcement, make it better and easier to fulfill its objectives; 
troops know the dos and don’ts and the red lines not to cross.  
In principle, and as mentioned earlier, peacekeeping was designed 
and envisaged to operate solely within inter-state conflicts. Yet 
following the end of the Cold War, new realities were imposed and 
inter-state peacekeeping seemed to be a memory of the past. In fact, 
in 1992, the large operation that was launched in Cambodia was 
designed to reconstruct the Cambodian state itself, in addition to 
other operations in Africa like Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and 
Somalia (MacQueen, 2006). 
Consequently, since peacekeeping operations can take place within 
the borders of states, the question that naturally emerges is the issue 
of sovereignty. In other words, where does sovereignty fit within the 
context of peacekeeping? And do allowing peacekeeping operations 
into a state’s territory jeopardize its sovereignty? The concept of 
sovereignty has been evolving significantly following the end of World 
War II, by moving towards a less dramatic approach, especially 
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following the creation of the United Nations, which withdrew a margin 
of states’ sovereignty through the admission process. 
For further illustration, when it comes to UN peacekeeping operations, 
admitting to the UN necessarily means giving up a margin of a state’s 
sovereignty. This is because the Security Council, under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, is permitted to take obligatory measures against a 
country while other countries are required, in a sense, to cooperate 
accordingly.  Nevertheless, the general rule necessarily implies 
respect for a state’s sovereignty. In fact, one of the basic three 
principles of peacekeeping operations is the consent of the parties 
where the operation is to be located. 
However, it is necessary to note that in some cases, the above 
principle no longer applies. For instance, in cases of genocide, “the 
response can’t be guided by a live-and-let-live pluralism” (MacQueen, 
2006). Genocide and violent eviction of populations are obviously 
unacceptable on the universal level; they are not rightful or valid local 
customs to be respected by the outsiders, who accept their validity 
even though they don’t share them. In such cases, the “Westphalian 
sovereignty must become subordinate to global values. The external 
response should surely be one of solidarity within a world 
community.” (MacQueen, 2006) 
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Therefore, the trend towards using force has been gaining more 
acceptances; though it is related to the failures of peacekeeping, 
mainly in Somalia and Bosnia, it is also related to the issue of 
sovereignty. In other words, if a state’s approval to the deployment of 
peacekeeping operations is becoming less of a requirement, then the 
presence of a force may be physically challenged. This may require 
imposing some sort of force on uncooperative parties (MacQueen, 
2006). UN’s presence in Somalia was challenged when UN Pakistani 
peacekeepers were attacked by one of the warlords, and in May 1995 
Bosnian Serbs kidnapped more than 350 UNPROFPR personnel 
(Lyman, 2004). 
Some formal recognition of this was provided in the early period of 
the Cold War in 1992 when the then Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali noted in his report An Agenda for Peace the difficulty of 
establishing a clear cut line between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. He actually proposed the creation of ‘peace enforcement 
units’ that would be deployed in specific circumstances with terms of 
reference specified in advance4 (Ghali, 1992, para. 4).  Since then, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “I recommend that the council consider the utilization of peace enforcement units 
in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in 
advance. Such units form member states would be available on call and would 
consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be 
more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive 
preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such 
forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the 
case of peacekeeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary General. I 
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the theoretical debate on the use of force in the United Nations has 
minimized (MacQueen, 2006).  
Since Peacekeeping operations were not mentioned anywhere in the 
Charter, the design, characteristics, principles and mode of operation 
were accumulated through experience and a process of trial and error. 
Nevertheless, the basic principles that have been, and still are, 
governing peacekeeping operations in general have been outlined by 
the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, established principally 
on the experience of UNEF I. Those principles are briefly summarized 
to be: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of 
force. While attempting to preserve the same essence, there has 
nevertheless been substantial development of the scope of functions 
of peacekeeping operations in response to new needs, especially with 
regard to traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
6.1 Consent of the Parties 
	  
The principle of the consent of parties refers directly to the parties of 
the conflict, whether states or non-states, and by consent, it means 
that they approve the involvement of a peacekeeping operation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consider such peace enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure 
under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace enforcement units should not be 
confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal 
with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which governments may agree 
to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peacekeeping operations.” 
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help in solving the conflict. The consent of the parties is necessary 
based on the assumption that lacking such consent would hinder the 
work of peacekeepers and thus prevent the operation from achieving 
its objectives. This principle applies mainly to traditional peacekeeping 
which, under Chapter VI, lacks any enforcement measure, thus 
making such support a necessity.  Without this, the operation is 
subject to a high risk of becoming a party to the conflict, thus 
jeopardizing getting involved in enforcement actions, and 
consequently being driven away from its inherent role of keeping the 
peace (DPKO, 2008).But this principle can as well be a major 
weakness since the consent can be withdrawn at a later stage, which 
counters all the efforts of the peacekeepers. Moreover, it’s important 
to note that it has become much more difficult to obtain the consent 
of the parties now that interstate wars have diminished in favor if 
intrastate wars. In other words, since civil wars have marked the 
post-Cold War period, the dynamics of conflicts have changed. It has 
become more difficult to precisely identify the parties of the conflict, 
and under such conditions, the consent can easily be withdrawn or 
denied afterward.  Furthermore, seeking consent of the warlords 
might bestow a semblance of recognition or legitimacy without 
necessarily achieving any results (Sitkowski, 2006).  
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When the UN second peacekeeping mission for Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
was established, it was recommended by the then Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali to have it under Chapter VII. He predetermined 
that the operation should not be subject to the consent of the local 
parties and factions involved (Osman, 2002). One year later, Boutros 
Ghali had to withdraw this stipulation following a series of hostile 
attacks against UNOSOM II and American forces, including the killing 
25 Pakistani soldiers and the shooting down of two US helicopters. 
Ghali then declared that UN forces would withdraw unless local clans 
showed readiness and willingness to cooperate with UNOSOM II. 
6.2 Impartiality 
	  
The principle of impartiality on the other hand, is a duty laid on the 
shoulders of the mission and the peacekeepers directly. The operation 
is supposed to be impartial in dealing with the parties of the conflict, 
“but not neutral in the execution of their mandate” (DPKO, 2008). 
For instance, peacekeepers can mobilize international support, can 
criticize, use pressure, negotiate, and even use some forceful 
measures when any of the parties breach the agreed arrangements, 
but they cannot take sides.  
The concept of impartiality is believed to be derived from Article 40 of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The article states that “in order to 
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prevent an aggravation of the situation, the security Council may . . . 
call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional 
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position 
of the parties concerned." Yet, similar to the remaining articles of 
Chapter VII, Article 40 was rarely explicitly referred to in UN 
resolutions during the Cold War due to the stalemate that the war had 
produced. This, however, did not prevent the missions from 
constantly working within such parameters (Boulden, 2005).It is 
within the same atmosphere that peacekeepers are also anticipated to 
be enablers rather than enforcers, in that they have no enemies and 
thus they are not there to win. Their efficiency and success relies on 
their voluntary cooperation. This facilitates their role to act impartially 
since they don’t form a threat on any one (Findlay, 2002). 
But the concept of impartiality has been subject to constant 
controversy and debate on whether it is concrete and applicable, and 
whether it is in the best interests of the objectives of the mission and 
the UN. Moreover, it is debatable whether peacekeeping missions 
whose mandates go beyond just monitoring, reporting, and mediating 
can truly be impartial, keeping in mind that impartiality must not be 
confused with neutrality, which is an integral component of 
humanitarian organizations like International Committee of Red Cross 
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(ICCR) or UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Sitkowski, 
2006).In other words, how can impartiality be interpreted in 
traditional peacekeeping operations versus peace enforcement 
missions? The above mentioned issues will be further elaborated later 
in this paper. 
6.3 Non-use of force 
	  
The third principle, non-use of force, can be the most ambiguous and 
tricky one, yet the most essential. Basically, with the creation of 
peacekeeping operations, new realities were imposed on the ground, 
most importantly, the introduction of light arms into the missions. 
Accordingly, the use of force principle was founded to apply in self-
defense cases only, and only as a last resort. The aim was to provide 
the peacekeeper with the means to protect himself, or his colleague 
through his own personal weapon. In fact, Dag Hammarskjold’s view 
in this regard was that use of force in peacekeeping operations should 
be restricted to self-defense only. He suggested that this was a 
potential complexity because of the fact that a broad interpretation of 
the right of self-defense might confuse the distinction between 
peacekeeping operations and combat operations which require a 
Chapter VII authorization (MacQueen, 2006).Consequently, and in 
order to clarify this matter, Hammarskjold “proposed a ‘prohibition 
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against any initiative in the use of armed force’. This formulation, if 
applied, might have closed off the possibility of peacekeepers’ actions 
impacting on the outcome of the conflict they were engaged with.” (as 
cited in MacQueen, 2006) 
The non-use of force principle—or minimum use of force as some may 
call it—has also evolved over the years to include broader elements. 
Experience established the need to allow peacekeepers to use force to 
halt attempts to disarm them, to defend their possessions such as 
their vehicles and equipment against seizure or attack, and to defend 
UN personnel and civilian agencies from attack. The decision of where 
to set the boundaries and limits was left to individual force 
commanders (Findlay, 2002). 
The last note to be mentioned here is that force, when used, should 
be proportionate to the threat. Lakhdar Brahimi had clearly 
recommended in his report of 2000 that UN peacekeepers should be 
capable of defending themselves, the mission’s mandate and its other 
components, with vigorous measures against those who seek to 
weaken the peace accords by violence, or to break their commitments 
toward them (Brahimi, 2000, Annex II, para. 3) 
Eventually, more than half of the UN peacekeeping operations before 
1988 had consisted of unarmed military observers only and force was 
used strictly in cases of self-defense; this could be directly identified 
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with traditional peacekeeping. Nevertheless, experience demonstrated 
that at some points, non-use of force made the peacekeeping 
operation ineffective (Yilmaz, 2005). For example, in Cyprus in 1974 
and in Lebanon in 1982, the presence of UN peacekeeping could not 
prevent foreign invasions. Yet, as an overall assessment, it could be 
said that UN peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1988 were 
relatively successful (Yilmaz, 2005). The UN’s booklet “United Nations 
peacekeeping operations: Principles and Guidelines” does not make 
this principle less ambiguous. Although the booklet restates that the 
use of force should be limited to self-defense and defense of the 
mandate, it also states that the Security Council has allowed the UN 
peacekeeping operations to “use all necessary means” to prevent 
forceful attempts to disturb the political process, protect civilians that 
are subject to threats of physical attack, and to support the national 
authorities in maintaining law and order, through giving them “robust” 
mandates (DPKO, 2008). 
Moreover, according to this booklet the use of enforcement should be 
resorted to as a last alternative, when other methods of persuasion 
have failed, and “an operation must always exercise restraint when 
doing so. The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter 
spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm 
civilians; and not to seek their military defeat.” (DPKO, 2008) 
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The use of force has been a subject of debate for long, not only 
concerning whether the UN should opt to use force, or how and when 
it should allow for the use of force, but also on how the different types 
of missions might be classified in terms of the degree of force they 
used (Findlay, 2002). 
The principle is that the use of force is limited to the minimum and in 
cases of self-defense only. In fact, Security Council resolutions usually 
do not mention the specific type of operation foreseen or the 
guidelines for the use of force it is supposed to operate under. As a 
matter of fact, such broad guidelines are provided by the Secretary 
General in a report where he includes his proposals for the use of 
force. The Security Council then endorses the Secretary General’s 
recommendations in the resolutions. Afterwards, whenever there is a 
need to change guidelines for the use of force during a mission, they 
are usually enclosed in a report of the Secretary General endorsed by 
the Security Council, but these are hardly ever mentioned in the 
resolution of the Security Council (Findlay, 2002). 
Basically, regulations regarding the use of force between the UN and 
the state hosting the peacekeeping operation are included in a 
document called the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ (SOFA) (sometimes 
referred to as Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or Standing (or 
standard) Operating Procedures (SOP)). This does not mean, as it 
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may seem, that the details, the rules and regulations on the use of 
force are included in this agreement or that the purpose of the 
agreement is to include such details. In fact, the reference to the use 
of force issue is extremely general (Findlay, 2002).  
On another level, the commander of the force may also formulate 
rules for the use of force through ‘Rules of Engagement’ (ROE) that 
are issued in written form to the troops in the field. The document 
specifies the circumstances and limitations under which the military 
forces can initiate or maintain fighting with the enemy (Findlay, 
2002). 
So, what is the limit of the use of force in comparison to restraint? 
Who can identify which party of the conflict is the ‘spoiler’? Wouldn’t 
using force against the ‘spoiler’ pose a threat against UN’s 
impartiality? Where is the line between using force against spoilers of 
peace and achieving, or not, a military defeat?  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Limitations and challenges of 
Peacekeeping 
	  
One of the limitations of peacekeeping is the lack and inadequacy of 
resources. Initially there was no agreement between major powers on 
whether to have a standing army for peacekeeping missions or for 
peace enforcement missions; therefore, Secretary Generals had relied 
heavily on the volunteerism of the states to provide the needed 
personnel and equipment (Goulding, 1993). In fact, some states have 
been more involved in contributing than others, yet their contribution 
may not always be appropriate for the operation; for their contingents 
may not be well trained to handle a mission. In fact, developing states 
were mostly the major contributors to missions rather than developed 
states, whereas states like the US, Russia, China and some European 
states were reluctant to commit forces where the risk of casualties 
was high (O’Neill& Rees, 2005). The five permanent members were 
significant contributors in providing logistical support, however, states 
like Poland, Bangladesh, Fiji, Ghana, Nepal, Canada and Scandinavian 
states were the regular troop contributing countries and helped in 
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defending the impartiality of the operation (Malone& Wermester, 
2000). 
Although states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations are often 
seen as the international community’s commitment toward preserving 
international peace and security, there are sometimes other motives 
that encourage states to make such commitments. Examples of such 
motives may be to earn money from the UN in return for their 
services (Sitkowski, 2006), or even to influence the direction of 
events or to have a say on the ground. In other words, states and 
their troops get paid in exchange of their participation in the 
peacekeeping mission. Moreover, being on the ground and getting 
directly engaged in the daily issues of the peacekeeping missions may 
provide the participant state with a privilege in deciding on matters 
that are small to be communicated to the headquarters, yet 
significant to influence the directions of the events. 
However, although willingly contributing upon the request of the 
organization, deployment is still slow in response to the emergency of 
the situations, which composes a second limitation of peacekeeping. 
Though not mentioned in this thesis, the  severity of the Rwandan 
tragedy may have been less acute  had the international system been 
able to immediately call on troops ready for battle; the rapid 
interposition of peacekeeping missions may have, as it is believed, 
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saved thousands of lives (Kennedy& Russett, 1995). Therefore, two 
suggestions were proposed: either creating Rapid Reaction forces to 
be ‘owned’ by the United Nations, or creating units within the national 
armed services of states, upon negotiation with the governments, that 
are ready for deployment immediately for the UN’s purposes.  
However, previous experience has demonstrated that making 
arrangements with governments does not necessarily work out. The 
“Stand by Arrangement System” mentioned previously in this 
document failed to maintain the states’ commitments towards 
contributing personnel. Although around 70 states pledged to do so, 
they did not fulfill their pledge in Rwanda. 
Furthermore, whether the first suggestion or the second is more 
convenient is still subject to debate; it is also deeply dependent on 
the nature of the operation, whether it is peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement. In other words, governments tend to be reluctant to 
contribute forces to the UN fearing that they may get involved and 
trapped in an operation whose purposes might alter with time 
(Kennedy& Russett, 1995) and change from being a peacekeeping 
operation to a peace enforcement operation. 
 Nevertheless, in cases of emergency, some sort of cooperation and 
joint effort between different actors is required for an immediate 
56	  
	  
response to crises. This may imply cooperation between UN 
peacekeeping, peace restoring or peace making operations on the one 
hand, and the UN and other regional and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) on the other hand. This approach has been 
taking place through the involvement of several regional and 
international actors by dividing tasks according to their comparative 
advantages. This approach, as necessary as it is, still holds certain 
risks that are worth mentioning; for instance, it is crucial to be 
sensitive to the risks of “the tribalization” of peacekeeping if regional 
bodies begin to assert ownership of conflicts within their geographic 
coverage (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001).  
However, the heavy reliance on the UN as a main provider of 
peacekeeping operations began to gradually diminish in favor of other 
options like regional organizations or other forms of alliances and 
organizations like NATO. In fact, almost all contemporary operations 
that fall, more or less, within the peace enforcement spectrum were 
launched under the umbrella of an international organization 
(Coleman, 2007), similar to NATO’s intervention in the case of Bosnia. 
In November 1995, following the efforts of the UN, and even the EU, 
that provided options and new alternatives, Serbs, Bosnians and 
Croats signed the Dayton Accords under the auspices of the United 
States (Osman, 2002); and by December 1995 the presence of the 
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United Nations in Bosnia was formally replaced by US led NATO 
forces. This represented the first incident where the United Nations 
handed over a whole peace enforcement mission and mandate-- not 
only the command of forces-- to member states (Osman, 2002).  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Case studies 
	  
8.1 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) 
	  
Following the independence of Cyprus in 1960, tensions kept 
mounting up between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and 
eventually, particularly in 1963, inter-communal violence broke out. 
The governments of Turkey, Greece, and Britain offered a joint effort 
for peacemaking in Cyprus until a conference that was intended to 
take place in London is convened to reach an agreement. With the 
agreement of the government of Cyprus, peacemaking efforts did 
occur. A ceasefire was established and a neutral zone, or “green line”, 
was created along the ceasefire line in Nicosia.  
Meanwhile, the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and the 
United Kingdom requested that the Secretary General appoints a 
special representative to observe the peacemaking operation. The 
representative, Lieutenant-General P S Gyani from India, was 
eventually appointed; his mission lasted for two months. However, 
the London Conference failed to reach an agreement and the Gyani 
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reported a serious deterioration in the situation with the prevalence of 
killing and kidnapping.  
After close consultations with the influential parties, Turkey, Greece 
and the United Kingdom, and with the consent of the Cypriot 
government, the Security Council voted unanimously to adopt 
resolution 186 (1964)5 authorizing the establishment of a 
peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) ("Establishment of 
UNFICYP", n.d.). 
In resolution 186(1964), the UN clearly indicates that the situation in 
Cyprus is considered a threat to international peace and security 
(Security Council Resolution 186(1964), 1964, para.1). The 
peacekeeping force was requested to “use its best efforts to prevent 
the recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the 
maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal 
conditions” (Security Council Resolution 186(1964), 1964, para.5). In 
addition to explaining the funding, the command and the reporting of 
the force, the resolution, interestingly, recommended that the 
Secretary General designate a mediator to work on a peace 
settlement and a resolution for the conflict. The resolution also named 
the governments of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom on 
several occasions, indicating the essential role they have both in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  Appendix	  I	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composition of the force, and in their support for the designated 
mediator. 
It was clear in the resolution that the force (or the mission) did not 
have any political role but to maintain peace and prevent the situation 
from lapsing into violence. This embodies a traditional peacekeeping 
par excellence, which intended to provide the necessary stability that 
would allow the conflicting parties to reach an agreement. It included 
the two main principles of a peacekeeping operation: the consent of 
the parties involved in the conflict and impartiality. However, the 
margin of the use of force was not mentioned at all in the resolution.   
The force was to be established for 3 months as mentioned in the 
resolution, yet, expectedly, the mandate was extended, and following 
six months after the establishment of the mandate a collection of 
guiding principles, still functioning until this day, were laid down by 
the Secretary General. The guiding principles reinforced the hierarchy 
of the chain of command as indicated in the resolution; yet, most 
importantly, the Secretary General’s guiding principles explained the 
use of force and clearly indicated that it is exclusively for self-defense 
which includes defense of the United Nations posts, premises and 
vehicles if attacked. When self-defense is used, then the principle of 
minimum force shall always prevail, and only if all other peaceful 
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means of persuasion are exhausted ("Deployment and Organization, 
n.d.)6.  
Several security unrests have taken place over the years, the most 
significant being that of 1974 when a coup d'état was initiated by the 
Greek Cypriots who favored a union with Greece. A Turkish military 
intervention followed and eventually occupied several areas of the 
Turkish Cypriot part. The Security Council convened and reached 
several resolutions that called for a cease fire, for an immediate 
withdrawal, and for negotiations among the parties concerned. In the 
meantime, UNFICYP was taken by surprise as it was not mandated 
nor prepared for large scale hostilities by armed forces, especially by 
one of the peace sponsoring powers. Its functions were limited to 
inter-communal incidents. Following the first period of deployment, 
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"The Force is under the exclusive control and command of the United Nations at all times. The 
Commander of the Force is appointed by and responsible exclusively to the Secretary-General. The 
contingents comprising the Force are integral parts of it and take their orders exclusively from the Force 
Commander. 
The Force undertakes no functions which are not consistent with the provisions of the Security Council's 
resolution of 4 March 1964. The troops of the Force carry arms which, however, are to be employed only 
for self-defense, should this become necessary in the discharge of its function, in the interest of 
preserving international peace and security, of seeking to prevent a recurrence of fighting and 
contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The 
personnel of the Force must act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards the members of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. 
As regards the principle of self-defense, it is explained that the expression of self-defense includes the 
defense of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of 
other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack. When acting in self-defense, the principle of minimum 
force shall always be applied and armed force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion 
have failed. The decision as to when force may be used in these circumstances rests with the 
Commander on the spot. Examples in which troops may be authorized to use force include attempts by 
force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their 
commanders, attempts by force to disarm them, and attempts by force to prevent them from carrying 
out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders." 
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violence still broke out; however, following another Security Council 
Resolution, which called for an immediate ceasefire, the governments 
of Turkey and Cyprus complied without conditions ("Supervision of the 
Cease-Fire, n.d.).  A ceasefire came into effect in August 1974.  Since 
then, the UNFICYP has continued observing any violations of the 
ceasefire and the military status quo in the buffer zone, especially in 
the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement. UNFICYP worked to 
protect civilians in a number of isolated villages, assisted in several 
evacuations, and maintained ceasefires at certain points. In fact, the 
ceasefire line was extended to 180 kilometers across the island 
("UNFICYP Background", n.d.), but this was the best it could do; for it 
was clearly neither prepared nor equipped to stop large scale 
hostilities.  
In his final report, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon mentioned 
the decrease in the military violations between both sides, and that 
for the fourth consecutive time; the military annual exercise has been 
cancelled on both sides ("Security Council Extends Mandate", 2011) 
On the other hand, in a very recent report in “Insight Turkey” on the 
development of the Cypriot issue, the author clearly states that “there 
has been virtually no violence between the two communities of the 
island--the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots--since 1974” 
(Sozen, 2012) where both are split by the UN Buffer Zone. Moreover, 
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several check points were established in 2003 that allowed for 
Cypriots from both communities to cross to the other sides, and even 
with this new development no significant inter communal incidents 
were reported (Sozen, 2012). 
As far as the governments’ positions on UNFICYP are concerned, it 
could be summarized in the statement of the permanent 
representative of Cyprus to the UN Ambassador Minas Hadjimichael: 
“You all know the position of my government. It has been the same 
all along. We consider the presence of the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Cyprus as indispensable as a conditio sine qua 
non as long as the occupation of part of the territory of the Republic 
of Cyprus by Turkey persists” ("Remarks by Ambassador Minas 
Hadjimichael", 2009). 
It would be fair to note, however, that some scholars, like Suha 
Bolukbasi, argue that in some disputes, an extended calming down 
period may actually lead the parties to take on more inflexible and 
uncompromising positions, thereby gradually diminishing the chances 
for a rational and practical compromise (Bolukbasi, 1998).  Whether 
UNFICYP provided such conditions or not remains open for discussion. 
Nonetheless, UNFICYP continues to be the only viable option until a 
permanent political settlement is reached. 
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Turkey on the other side, in the request for the extension for UNFICYP 
in 2010, has received the resolution with a negative vote. The Turkish 
Ambassador justified the vote on the grounds that the Turkish part of 
the island is not recognized in the resolution and that there hasn’t 
been a joint government representing both communities ("Security 
Council Extends UN Mission in Cyprus", 2010). However, the 
extension has been regularly taking place, the last being till July 
2012, knowing that other UN good offices efforts are taking place in 
parallel to reach a permanent agreement between both communities. 
At this point, UNFICYP had taken several humanitarian tasks that 
were mentioned later on in the Security Council resolutions and this 
was when the wider peacekeeping aspect started to become part of 
the tasks of the force. In fact, a humanitarian and economics branch 
was founded at the force’s headquarters. UNFICYP supports both 
communities in resuming their regular civil activities like resuming 
farming and the supply of electricity and water 
UNFICYP is a success story because it managed to realize the 
objectives of the mandate authorizing it. UNFICYP was not in any way 
requested to provide a political solution for the Cyprus dilemma. It 
was the UN’s good offices and the parties involved who failed to 
reaching a political settlement.  A clear distinction should be made in 
this regard. 
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Until today, UNFICYP, that has been composed of troops from 
Argentina, Austria, Canada, Hungary, Peru, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom and total fatalities of 178 personnel of the mission 
("UNFICYP Fact Sheet", n.d.), has been restructured to meet the 
changes, while maintaining the core tasks of supervising ceasefire 
lines and maintaining a buffer zone, assuming humanitarian activities, 
and supporting the good offices and missions of the Secretary-General 
("UNFICYP Background", n.d.).   
8.2 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
	  
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is one of the long 
peacekeeping operations, being in existence since 1978. It is a 
complex case that has witnessed difficult circumstances, being 
involved in one of the most complicated conflicts in modern history, 
which is the Arab -Israeli conflict and as other peacekeeping missions 
that took place in Egypt and Syria.  
It should be clarified that UNIFIL is an interesting case in because it 
went through three stages and modifications caused by three different 
events; the first phase being from 1978 to 1982, the “Israeli” 
invasion, the second from 1982 to 2000, the Israeli withdrawal and up 
to the 2006 war, and finally, the third being the phase following 2006 
and resolution 1701.  
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It started when the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon 
conducted an attack in “Israel”, leading to an Israeli invasion of   
Lebanon in 1978. The Israeli invasion occupied Southern Lebanon. 
The Lebanese government protested to the Security Council based on 
the argument that the Lebanese government had no connection to the 
Palestinian commando operation. Accordingly, the Council adopted 
resolution 425 and 4267 upon which UNIFIL was formulated.  
Resolution 425 called “Israel” for the immediate cessation of military 
action and for the withdrawal of its forces from all Lebanese 
territories. On the operational level, the force is required to confirm 
this withdrawal, assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the 
return of its effective authority in the area, and restore international 
peace and security ("Security Council Resolution 425(1978)", n.d.). 
Yet, resolution 425 requested the Secretary General to present a 
report on the implementation of the resolution; therefore, UNIFIL is 
said to be established under resolution 425 and 426, since the actual 
decision of the establishment of UNIFIL was stated in resolution 426, 
based on the Secretary General’s report.  
The report, upon which resolution 426 was based, included a detailed 
Terms of Reference for the force. It is important to be familiar with 
the basics upon which it was established. For instance, in clause (2) – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Appendix II 
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d of the report, the force is required to ”use its best efforts”, and not” 
all necessary means”, to prevent the return of fighting ("Report of the 
Secretary General", 1978) although clause six of the report states 
that the force is to take ‘all measures deemed necessary’ to assure 
the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty ("Report of the 
Secretary General", 1978, clause 6). However, neither the resolution 
nor the report mentioned any other actor than the Lebanese and 
Israeli governments; in other words, the PLO was not mentioned 
anywhere in either of the documents since it was not recognized by 
the UN. Finally, both the resolution and the report state that the force 
will be deployed for an initial period of six months but may continue 
operating afterwards if the Security Council decides so. 
The resolution did not explicitly mention the chapter under which it is 
authorized, which traditionally means that it falls under Chapter VI of 
the charter. The report also stated that the force must comply with 
the principles and guidelines that were set by UNEF I, which are 
impartiality and the minimum use of force— for self-defense only.  
UNIFIL’s success or failure is clearly directly attached to the extent of 
compliance of the parties involved since it has no enforcement 
measures; “Israel’s” compliance on the other hand is directly 
connected to the amount of pressure that the United States is willing 
to put.  Moreover, assessing UNIFIL cannot be comprehensive without 
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assessing the UN’s, mainly the Security Council’s, approach and the 
way it handles the Lebanese “Israeli” conflict. This is because to a 
large extent it affected the formation of and authorities given to 
UNIFIL. Although some might consider that this is only natural, it has 
a different connotation when it comes to “Israel” and the United 
States’ influence in anything that has to do with Israel. Although the 
U.S.  originally sponsored and supported the proposal of establishing 
UNIFIL, it did not put sufficient pressure on its allies to cooperate with 
UNIFIL as it was preoccupied with other issues happening in the 
Middle East at the time like the Camp David peace agreement and the 
revolution in Iran (Murphy, 2002). In fact, Ray Murphy, (a lecturer in 
law at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law at the 
National University of Ireland, argues that the central elements of the 
crisis in the Middle East were ignored in the resolution, which made 
many members reluctant to support the establishment of the force; 
therefore, UNIFIL was established with unclear and unrealistic 
objectives but was nonetheless agreed on, reluctantly, in order to 
resolve the crisis (Murphy, 2002).  
The tasks were limited then to confirm Israeli withdrawal from South 
Lebanon, and to assist the government of Lebanon in re-establishing 
its effective authority in the area in addition of course to the 
observation of ceasefire. 
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Eventually, UNIFIL did not have an easy task when it came to carrying 
out the objectives set in the resolution; Israel remained occupying the 
South, and a new military force, South Lebanon Army, supported by 
and affiliated with “Israel”, was formed in 1979 and carried out 
military actions in Lebanon.  
Moreover, significant turning points took place in 1982 when Israel 
invaded Lebanon, reaching Beirut, and overrode UNIFIL. UNIFIL 
initially was not meant to fight and was not equipped to do so. 
Accordingly, UNIFIL’s role at the time was limited to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance for local population and to report on the 
situation ("Security Council Resolution 518 and 519", 1982), as 
mandated in Security Council resolutions 518 and 5198. The situation 
remained unchanged until the withdrawal of the Israeli forces in May 
2000, which was perceived at the time as “Israel’s” compliance with 
resolution 425, although it came 22 years late.  However, the ‘Shebaa 
Farms’ remain disputed land. During that phase, UNIFIL maintained 
its humanitarian aid in addition to monitoring the line of withdrawal. 
The marking of the Blue line was one of the most significant updates 
during this period. Although the situation remained relatively calm, 
there were several breaches by the Israelis of the Blue line, and air 
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and sea boundaries. Despite these breaches, the extension continued 
every six months.  
The ‘Israeli’ war in July 2006 was probably the most significant event 
in the life of UNIFIL. "Israel" launched a full scale war that caused 
massive destruction of the infrastructure and the loss of lives of 
civilians. The war lasted 33 days. A resolution had to be issued and 
that is resolution 17019, which called for “a full cessation of hostilities 
in the month-long war based on, in particular, “the immediate 
cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by 
Israel of all offensive military operations” in Lebanon ("Security 
Council Resolution 1701", 2006).  
Resolution 170110expanded UNIFIL’s mandate. For the first time, the 
Council decided to include the Maritime Task Force as part of the UN 
peacekeeping operation. It also significantly developed UNIFIL from 
about 2,000 troops just before the war to 15,000 military personnel, 
and expanded its original mandate. 
The main tasks remained more or less the same, revolving around 
monitoring the cessation of hostilities but with extended tasks when it 
comes to humanitarian and civilian assistance and support, in addition 
to support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese 
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government in matters of securing the borders. Accordingly, UNIFIL, 
even with the new modifications, remained working within the same 
old limitations. It is still a peacekeeping force.11 
Violations are still taking place by the Israelis. The most recent was in 
December 2010 when Israel penetrated the Shebaa farms and two 
Israeli troops crossed the technical fence at the Ras al-Sammaqa site 
in the Shebaa Farms and moved 20 meters into disputed territories 
("Israel Again Violates Lebanese Air Space", n.d.). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the total fatalities of UNIFIL 
amounted to a total of 294 and the contributing countries throughout 
the years were Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Cambodia, 
China,   Cyprus, Spain, El Salvador, Portugal, FYR of Macedonia, 
Germany, Brazil, Ghana, Greece, Croatia, Guatemala, Hungary, 
Brunei, India, Indonesia, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Belarus, 
Nepal, Serbia, Nigeria, France, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, 
Slovenia, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Timor-Leste. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11The tasks were to: “Monitor the cessation of hostilities; Accompany and support the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South, as Israel withdraws its 
armed forces from Lebanon; Coordinate these activities with the Governments of Lebanon 
and Israel; Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations 
and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; Assist the LAF in taking steps 
towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an free of any armed 
personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of 
UNIFIL deployed in this area; Assist the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and 
other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related 
material”. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Peace enforcement 
	  
The concept of peace enforcement was derived from the principle of 
collective security though they are not the same (Osman, 2002). 
Peace enforcement holds a different set of classification and tasks that 
have evolved over time due to unanticipated needs, such as restoring 
democracy and combating international terrorism, and other tasks like 
attaining compliance (Osman, 2002). For instance, Peace enforcement 
operations are known to fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
are mandated by the Security Council. This gives it [the Security 
Council] the authority to determine when a threat or breach of 
international peace and security has occurred, to order interim 
measures under Article 40, and to call for enforcement actions to be 
taken against a state or entities within a state (Bellamy, Williams & 
Griffin, 2004). Thus, peace enforcement uses means that include the 
use or threat of military force in an aim to “enforce peace” by 
inducing one or more parties to adopt peace agreement or a 
settlement previously approved. “They do not attempt to militarily 
defeat the party concerned, but rather to coerce it to comply with the 
will of the international community and with its previously agreed 
commitments” (Findlay, 2002).  
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The concept of peace enforcement was thought up and introduced by 
the former Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992-1993, 
following peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Angola, Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed the formation of ‘peace-
enforcement units’ capable of protecting ceasefires against 
disobedient factions. The idea then rapidly developed into the concept 
of peacekeeping operations that are authorized under Chapter VII and 
that do not necessarily require the consent of the conflicting parties to 
be legitimized (Coleman, 2007). 
However, it’s crucial to note that, theoretically speaking, peace 
enforcement is intended to be impartial in dealing with all parties. It is 
in this sense that they are different from an invasion: they do not 
explicitly seek to alter the political or geographical status quo to the 
benefit of the invader (Coleman, 2007), although they necessarily 
require involvement in the internal affairs of the states targeted, 
especially since the consent of the parties involved is not a 
prerequisite. On the opposite side, Shashi Thoroor tends to be harsher 
in his perception of peace enforcement; he considers peace 
enforcement to be used as a cover up for the desire to resort to war 
“without making the hard political and military choices that war 
requires” (as cited in O’Neill& Rees, 2005). 
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According to scholars like David Malone and Karin Wermester, the 
peacekeeping operations preserved their original tasks of bolstering 
peace processes, keeping the peace, and observing the peace, until 
the end of 1980s (Malone& Wermester, 2000).  
It is difficult to pinpoint the mission of peace enforcement since 
throughout the cases there was no clear line separating between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The resolutions creating the 
missions were seldom clear about the scope of the mission especially 
as far as the use of force is concerned. Moreover, some missions 
started as peacekeeping missions, and due to several developments, 
shifted to become peace enforcement mission. 
Peace enforcement increased significantly in 1990s when UN 
(between 1990 and 1999) invoked 166 Chapter VII resolutions 
comparedto 24 similar resolutions between the years 1946 and 1989 
(Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004).  It has also been affected by the 
new post-Cold war realities, namely the increase in intra-state 
conflicts and complicated civil wars    .Furthermore, it has actually 
been invoked in the face of civil wars despite the fact that the authors 
of the charter did not envisage that a collective security system will 
be directly dealing with internal wars and delivery of humanitarian aid 
to civilians; a collective security system was presumed to take only 
between states (Osman, 2002). 
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In summary, peace enforcement includes the employment of Chapter 
VII of mandatory enforceable measures by the Security Council 
including arms embargo, diplomatic and economic sanctions, air and 
maritime blockade and the use of force (though this thesis will solely 
focus on the use of force). The consent of any party to the conflict 
would be helpful for the operation, but it is not a prerequisite for 
military deployment” (Osman, 2002). 
9.1 Why the UN should not resort to Peace 
enforcement 
	  
The UN was founded to preserve international peace and Security, but 
not to impose peace by force. It lacks the necessary structure, 
equipment, political consensus to do so. 
9.1.1 Inexistence of appropriate structure 
	  
“At present there is no continuum from consensual peacekeeping to 
collective enforcement” because there is still no mechanism for 
setting up a collective security force under Chapter VII and so the 
United Nations has resorted to subcontracting enforcement operations 
(Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). In fact, the UN still doesn’t have ‘peace 
enforcement units’ as foreseen by former UN Secretary General 
Boutros Ghali, though it has established the State of High Readiness 
Brigade (SHIRBRIG) (declared operational since January 2000) which 
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forms the closest approximation to a permanent UN military 
capability.  This was in light of the fact that at the time of the 
formulation of the Charter by the great powers, each participant was 
in favor of a permanent force at some point in the process, which was 
indicated in Article 43 of the Charter that established a Military Staff 
Committee (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004).  
In addition, the organizational structure of the UN imposes an 
additional complication because it consists of numerous agencies in 
the context of a complex organizational system that has its internal 
difficulties in coordination, and thus, the ability of the UN to organize 
cooperative actions still hasn’t fully matured and still needs to be 
demonstrated (Osman, 2002). Marrack Goulding stated: “As for the 
UN system, there are well-known jealousies and competition between 
its programs, funds and agencies, each of which has its own 
intergovernmental policy-making body, its own mandate, its own 
sources of funding and its own chain of command” (Goulding, 1999) 
 Accordingly, there has been a grey area between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement that can impose considerable hazards and risks. In 
other words, there is a great difference between deploying troops with 
the consent, support and cooperation of the parties concerned to help 
them carry out the agreement they have reached, and between 
deployment without their consent yet with the powers and means to 
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use force to coerce them to accept the decisions of the Security 
Council. This applies in political, military and legal terms and in terms 
of the survival of the troops (Goulding, 1993). In fact, in Somalia, the 
Somali warlords were against the peacekeeping missions and 
eventually forced them out (Rotberg, 2000) (which will be explained 
later). 
Furthermore, peacekeeping has been prevalent over peace 
enforcement, this prevalence has had an intense impact on the 
conception of peace enforcement. Writers tended to use the term 
‘operations’ to describe peace enforcement measures, although it was 
originally applied to peacekeeping. This understanding obfuscates the 
differences in functions and mandate between the two methods and 
diminishes peace enforcement to the act of ‘deployment’ (Osman, 
2002).  
Additional reason why the UN should not resort to peace enforcement 
is the lack of political will, in other words, the UN is politically 
incapable of doing so. For instance, establishing a peace enforcement 
mission requires a clear wording in the resolutions and a clear 
mandate. This requires unanimity and a unified position on the part of 
the Security Council, which is never the case. Ambiguity imprinted 
most of the supposedly “peace enforcement” missions leading to 
catastrophic results, not to mention having unrealistic mandates and 
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inadequate command and control. All of these were major reasons 
behind the failure of the UN’s mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) 
(Allen, 1997) 
Moreover, an unshakeable commitment on the part of the contributing 
members should be present prior to resorting to peace enforcement 
mission. When the U.S. suffered casualties during its involvement in 
Somalia through “Restore Hope operation”, it departed and other 
coalition members began to follow.Things were left again in the hands 
of UNOSOM II, and being much weaker now, it pulled out as well in 
1995. 
some scholars tend to favor peace enforcement while others prefer 
maintaining traditional peacekeeping missions, especially as far as the 
involvement of the United Nations is concerned.  
Katharina Coleman, for instance, tends to favor peace enforcement. 
Coleman argues that the failure of UN peacekeeping forces to stop 
massacres and genocide in Bosnia and Somalia demonstrates the 
limitations of peacekeeping methods and the need to impose peace on 
a continuing conflict, even if it had to be against the wishes of some 
combatants, via enforcement operations. She explains that peace 
enforcement operations, unlike peacekeeping operations, are 
expected to use military force when required. Therefore, their 
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personnel are deployed fully equipped in arms and permitted to use 
the needed force to accomplish their mission (Coleman, 2007). 
Scholars disagree on whether the UN should or should not resort to 
peace enforcement. Some, like Michael O’Connor, have laid his 
judgment on the ineffectuality of the UN in peace enforcement. He 
attributes the reasons to the difficulty of achieving consensus among 
the permanent members of the Security Council, or at least enough of 
a consensus to avoid the use of veto. Additionally, it is due to the 
inability of the United Nations to deploy a credible and capable force 
without the leadership of a permanent member, usually the USA 
(O'Connor, 2001). Somalia is the case of a clear such demonstration, 
and later Bosnia.  
Nevertheless, a general rule can be that in an ideal situation, having 
all the convenient circumstances of impartiality, lack of political 
interest of the international community, and accessibility of the 
needed resources available, peace enforcement can potentially 
encourage a remarkable shift towards achieving international peace 
and order. Yet, this requires an ideal world where there is an 
international consensus on what is just and what is unjust, where 
interests can be put aside for the collective good of human beings, 
and where unlimited resources are available, which is absolutely not 
the case.  
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Thakur and Schnabel on the other hand, are more cautious in their 
analysis, as they realizes that peace enforcement would have a strong 
humanitarian character when peacekeepers are willing to put their 
lives at stake to protect humanitarian aid deliveries or to strike back 
when belligerents violate human rights, yet only if applied successfully 
(Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). This is with the realization that such 
operations become deeply involved in the internal affairs of the states 
concerned, and lack of consent and support of the conflicting parties 
is considered only an impediment to the expanded mandate of the 
mission. Nevertheless, “the selective application and frequent failure 
of many peace enforcement missions in trigging lasting peace 
questions the assumption that peace and justice can indeed be 
achieved through war” (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). 
9.1.2. Contradiction to the spirit of the UN 
	  
Even if the concept ever gains unanimous acceptance, the UN still is 
not the party to adopt such an approach due to several reasons. First, 
the question remains: should the UN be involved in war fighting at 
all? Imposing peace, forcefully, contradicts the spirit on which the UN 
was established. Concepts like peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
conflict resolution are often incompatible with enforcing peace while 
neglecting the collaboration and cooperation of the parties of the 
conflict. In fact, Westphalian enforcement measures were initially 
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designed and envisaged to protect states, reduce the use of force 
between them, and guard them against imperialism. Therefore, UN’s 
attempt of enforcement, in the post Westphalian phase, has been 
criticized for being a form of neo-imperialism (Bellamy, Williams & 
Griffin, 2004).  
Added to the lack of the material factors to support peace 
enforcement operations is also the lack of the consensus in the 
Security Council necessary to provide the political cover. Though the 
main responsibility of the Security Council as determined by Article 24 
of the Charter is to maintain international peace and security, this 
principle is contradicted in theory by yielding the special privileges of 
the veto power to the permanent members.  This is often used it to 
protect their interests, or even resort to compromises between the 
great powers and with the non-permanent members to safeguard 
limited national interests. As a result, the system may authorize an 
action at the request of a permanent member while such an action 
may not necessarily reflect the interests of the majority of member 
states in the UN as a whole (Osman, 2002). 
The Charter of the UN adds a further complication to the assessment 
of peace enforcement since neither peacekeeping nor the problems 
that accompanied its evolution were envisaged when it was drafted 
and similar to many national constitutions, it is almost impossible and 
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inflexible to amend such documents. Consequently, this has left a 
great space for constant reinterpretation “to sanction undertaking 
which, on the face of it, were never intended” (Findlay, 2002).  
Even political and lawful circumstances are not always available for 
peacekeeping operations, whether within peacekeeping or 
enforcement context. Resolutions never clearly indicate the 
enforcement nature of a peacekeeping mission for example. 
Consequently, being vaguely worded raises questions of interpretation 
particularly over the precise conditions that need to be achieved in 
order to cease the enforcement measures (Bellamy, Williams & 
Griffin, 2004). Moreover, and in addition to questions of command 
and control of enforcement operations, is the question of the political 
will, in other words, whether the contributing states can maintain the 
political will to proceed with enforcement measures despite the rising 
costs and casualties they may face, which is equally crucial for the 
mission (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004).  
Turning a peacekeeping mission into a fighting force may impose 
several problems. First, the nature of peace enforcement missions 
requires a long commitment. “Foreign armies, including those fighting 
under the UN blue flag, cannot impose peace on civil wars without 
also imposing foreign rule: this was the logic of colonialism” (Thakur 
and Schnabel, 2001). Second, impartiality, being one of the most 
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significant principles of peace keeping, is difficult to be implemented 
in peace enforcement; the forces can’t join the fight without taking 
sides when they want to impose peace. On the other hand, the 
doctrine of impartiality is itself an obstacle to peace enforcement even 
as far as law is concerned. In other words, the law cannot be impartial 
between those who break the law and those who respect it and abide 
by it (O'Connor, 2001).  
Upon researching peacekeeping and peace enforcement, one may 
notice that there is a tendency to regardall UN peace operations 
basically corresponding to peacekeeping. The tendency to use such 
terms to describe authorized enforcement actions reflects an intention 
to safeguard the impartiality of peacekeeping (Osman, 2002). “For 
practical reasons, the UN tended not to declare its intention to 
undertake coercive measures in relation to internal conflicts in order 
to avoid provocation and obvious resistance” (Osman, 2002). This is 
because this might lead some of the parties involved in the conflict to 
believe that the UN is taking sides and may take actions against 
them, thus fostering hostility against the UN forces.  
Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary General for Special 
Political Tasks, stated: “The real strength of a peacekeeping force lies 
not in its capacity to use force, but precisely in its not using force and 
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thereby remaining above conflict and preserving its unique position 
and prestige” (as cited in Findlay, 2002). 
Even the impartiality of the UN is put at stake if it is involved in peace 
enforcement, since the prerequisites and requirements of the forces 
deployed to enforce a mandatory measure is different from that of the 
peacekeeping forces. In other words, the enforcement forces do not 
have to obtain the consent of the conflicting parties, and they may 
even be instructed to desert impartiality at some point or to direct 
their weapons against one side (Osman, 2002).  
 
9.1.3. Lack of resources 
	  
“The UN cannot easily intervene militarily for peace to prevent 
intrastate or interstate conflicts. Nor can it do so rapidly, if at all” 
(Rotberg, 2000).  
Securing the convenient circumstances for establishing similar 
(military) forces is in itself a very difficult task. For instance, the UN 
lacks the availability of the needed resources, peacekeeping forces 
are not sufficiently equipped, nor are the peacekeepers well trained; 
there are no financial resources or equipment that are readily 
available.  In fact the equipment used is mainly provided by the 
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contributing countries that are mostly poor countries with poor 
equipment. 
The UN doesn’t have the troops or the equipment required for 
enforcement measures. Accordingly, there is a detachment between 
the theoretical provision for UN military enforcement measures and 
the matter-of-fact lack of UN military capability. Therefore, the 
Security Council has been repeatedly obligated to hand over its 
Chapter VII powers to UN principal or subsidiary organs, or to UN 
member states or regional arrangements (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 
2004).  
Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning the UN’s 
intervention in Iraq in 1990-1991 that might be considered successful 
peace enforcement.  
As mentioned earlier, a successful peace enforcement mission has to 
be supported by a major power and a unanimous political will from 
the Security Council. Yet, this means risking the objectivity of the 
mission, and its failure if the major power decides to withdraw its 
support, similar to US’s intervention in Somalia.   
As Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council granted Chapter 
VII authorities to the US led coalition. The mission, desert shield, was 
heavily equipped with 500,000 US troops, and 200,000 from 27 other 
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states (The UN and the Gulf War, n.d.). The mission, followed by 
‘Desert Storm’ has succeeded in liberating Kuwait and thus in 
achieving the objectives of the intervention.  
This successful intervention is caused by the rare availability of the 
following factors, the political will of the major powers, the provision 
of the needed resources for the fulfillment of the objectives, and a 
clear chain of command, led also by a major power. All of which have 
rarely ever existed later on. In fact, Amitai Etizioni clearly stated that 
“if one looks at Operation Desert Storm that pushed Saddam out of 
Kuwait in 1991, one will rank it as very successful if one assumes its 
goal was to reaffirm the long established Westphalian norm that lies 
at the very foundation of the prevailing world order—that no nation 
may use its armed forces to invade another nation, and nations that 
do so will be pushed back and “punished.” (Etzioni, 2012)  
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CHAPTER TEN 
Case Studies 
	  
10.1 UNOSOM 
	  
Somalia represents the quintessential example of the absence of 
consent of the conflicting parties, UN organizational incapability, lack 
of consensus of the Security Council and use of force outside the self-
defense boundaries, all of which lead to the failure of the intervention 
both on the level of un-fulfillment of the objectives and casualties. 
Following the independence of Somalia in 1960, British and Italian 
Somali lands were unified, and Mohamed Siad Barre took over in a 
coup after which Somalia went through an authoritarian era that went 
through several ups and downs in terms of both the allegiances with 
the US and Soviets and the Ethiopian issue on the border.  It is not in 
the scope of this thesis to discuss the details of the pre-civil war era, 
but in brief Somalia had reached 1990 having several political 
factions, mostly clans, emerged and ready to challenge and topple 
Siad Barre’s rule.  
The most important of those clans was the one led by Mohammad 
Farrah Aideed. Aideed eventually managed to topple Siad Barre and a 
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new era of inter-clan complex relations started. An additional actor 
appeared on the scene and that is Mohammad Ali Mahdi who was 
elected as the President of Somalia in 1991. Aideed challenged 
Mahdi’s rule as he believed he was more righteous for the leadership. 
Accordingly, Aideed and Ali Mahdi were the two most significant 
actors on the Somali Arena and thus were internationally sought for 
negotiations. 
Eventually, in 1991 civil war broke out in Somalia where lawlessness 
and chaos grew massively. Spread of drought added more tragedy, 
and famine dominated the scene. Accordingly, humanitarian and relief 
organizations entered the country to reduce the suffering. The 
government was not functioning at the time and there was no 
infrastructure to rely on. Therefore, food had become a source of 
power, and local warlords were seizing up to 80 percent of the relief 
aid deliveries (Allen, 1997).  
Initially, the Security Council, showed interest in dealing with the 
Somali issue. This was reflected in the budget dedicated to the cause, 
which reached $2 (Howard, 2008) billion, and in the fact that sixteen 
out of the seventeen Security Council decisions regarding Somalia 
between 1992 and 1994 were unanimous with no abstentions 
(Howard, 2008).  
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Having an unbearable humanitarian situation, the United Nations 
decided to intervene in the situation. Accordingly, the Security Council 
authorized three operations over the years; UNOSOM I (April 1992 – 
March 1993), UNITAF (December 1992 – May 1993), and UNOSOM II 
(March 1993 – May 1995), although they were different in nature, in 
the sense that UNOSOM I was a simple peacekeeping force; UNITAF 
was a US led multinational force, and UNOSOM II was the “peace 
enforcement” mission.  
 Initially, UNOSOM I was formed of fifty unarmed UN military 
observers for the simple task of overseeing a ceasefire and the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. At first, it obtained the initial approval of 
Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideed and therefore achieved a 
promising beginning (Howard, 2008).   One of the major challenges 
here is that none of the five permanent members participated in 
UNOSOM I, and their type of interest and involvement changed with 
the developing course of actions. This is also one of the challenges of 
peacekeeping in internal and civil wars. 
Eventually, it was impossible to secure the humanitarian aid with only 
500 peacekeepers. It was then that the US stepped in and influenced 
the course of events significantly. 
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It should be noted clearly that the US’ role in the Somali matter 
affected the course of events profoundly. Initially it did not participate 
in the UNOSOM I, but the interest increased as the media projected 
the humanitarian suffering in Somalia, causing public pressure to 
intervene and put an end to the suffering.  
The second challenge is that the internal UN problems and 
dysfunctions reflected gravely on the missions; for instance, there 
was a disconnection between the field and the headquarters. An 
example of that are the miscommunication and the lack of 
coordination between the UN’s representative in the negotiations, 
Algerian Ambassador Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun and the UN 
headquarters.  
Sahnoun managed to build confidence with the various political 
leaders involved, where he listened to their concerns and negotiated 
extensively with them. He could even get the political will of the 
warring parties to cover for the UNOSOM I, therefore it started 
promisingly and successfully. He could get the approval of Aideed and 
Ali Mahdi to deploy 500 UN peacekeepers to protect the humanitarian 
aid although it was a challenge to convince Aideed that the UN and its 
troops would maintain impartiality.  
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Yet Sahnoun did not find the common grounds with the UN 
headquarters where his efforts could be interpreted into UN initiatives 
to capture the moment and achieve peace (Howard, 2008). Tension 
raised between the headquarters, mainly the Secretary General at the 
time, Boutros BoutrosGhali, and Mr. Sahnoun. Eventually, the 
miscommunication and lack of coordination was translated into the 
UN’s Security Council resolution to deploy additional 3000 troops 
without consulting with Sahnoun or the conflicting parties which 
caused Aideed to withdraw his approval and support to UN efforts.  
Sahnoun was forced to resign and another representative, Iraqi 
Ambassador Ismat Kittani was appointed. Kittani had a different 
approach to dealing with the issue, which in itself marked 
inconsistency in the UN’s handling of matters. Kittani had more of a 
headquarters approach, where decisions would be taken at the 
headquarters level, and then implemented in the field (Howard, 
2008).  
Yet the situation continued deteriorating and the Security Council 
declared the situation in Somalia to be “a threat to international 
security” and by the end of 1992 both the Secretary General and the 
Security Council stated that it was time to move from peacekeeping to 
peace enforcement by allowing coercive measures in Somalia 
(Osman, 2002) and thus issued authorization to “use all necessary 
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means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia” (Allen, 1997). That was when the US initiated 
the large scale “Restore Hope” operation where the US led and 
provided 28,000 military forces to the UN coalition known as the 
United Task Force (UNITAF). So, in December 1992 the UNITAF was 
established. It was composed of multinational troops deployed in 
Somalia, most of which were Americans. Its aim was mainly to secure 
the routes for humanitarian aid.  
However, UNITAF was not able to achieve much towards ending the 
war, yet it managed to secure the humanitarian routes to some 
extent (Howard, 2008). But the tasks were given up and handed over 
to the UN again, this time under UNOSOM II. 
Yet, the way the UN handled the matter made a significant difference 
especially when moving from peacekeeping (in UNOSOM I) to peace 
enforcement (in UNOSOM II and UNITAF), which will be further 
discussed later. 
UNOSOM II’s tasks were wider in scope. Specifically, they included 
restoring order to Somalia, rebuilding the political and economic 
institutions and disarming the Somalis in addition to securing 
humanitarian routes, accordingly, this was established under Chapter 
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VII, which authorized “all means necessary to protect humanitarian 
relief efforts and to disarm the combatants.  
The major problem was that the resolution was vague and there was 
no plan or clear instructions for how to proceed with the 
implementation on field (Howard, 2008). Moreover, the troops, 
equipment and funding were insufficient, and the chain of command 
was unclear. They had a peace enforcement mandate with 
peacekeeping preparations and equipment.  
Therefore, the U.N. had to ask the member states for additional 
support especially in providing airlifts of humanitarian relief supplies. 
The U.S. responded, and an additional Pakistani force joined. But, 
having enforcement authorized in a civil war context it was difficult for 
the forces to stay clear of the competing political agendas and 
warlords within the country (Lyman, 2004). The Pakistani 
peacekeepers were eventually attacked, and casualties were high. The 
UN and the U.S. decided to reply and capture the warlord Aideed 
which made the situation even worse, and this time Americans were 
subject to an ambush where 18 Americans were killed (Felitz, 
2002).Eventually the American troops withdrew and handed it over to 
the UN which ended shortly after without achieving the main 
objectives. The withdrawal was justified by the hostility and the lack 
of cooperation on the part of the conflicting parties (Osman, 2002). 
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Somalia returned to a state of chaos that remained for many 
subsequent years.  
Poor management affected UNOSOM II deeply. There was a lack of 
coordination between the different countries involved in the 
peacekeeping mission and the UN, to the extent where the 
commanders insisted on consulting with their governments before 
accepting orders from UN commanders. And ultimately it was 
considered a catastrophic mission both for the U.N. and the 
U.S.(Felitz, 2002) 
 
10.2 UNPROFOR 
	  
Bosnia represents another complicated case that has put many 
questions on the table regarding peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement.  
Following the collapse of communism and the death of Tito, 
Yugoslavia was burning with various ethnicities and nationalities 
longing for separation and independence. War broke out, and the 
international community was stuck in hesitation and struggle between 
several strategies to control the situation. There was a preference 
towards avoiding military intervention, yet the UN could not get away 
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from the mix (Lyman, 2004). The initial plan was a mixture of cease 
fire, reaching an agreement on partition, and a deployment of UN 
force to protect the “safe areas”, where a Muslim minority was 
surrounded by territories controlled by the Serbs.  The hope was to 
achieve withdrawal of the Serbian forces and disarm militias (Lyman, 
2004), a plan that would soon prove to be too ambitious and ill 
prepared.  
Accordingly, Resolution 713 was issued by the Security Council which 
imposed a mandatory and complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to all parts of Yugoslavia (Security 
Council Resolution 713, 1991). The UN at the time realized that the 
conditions were not suitable to deploy forces, therefore, at first, a 
small UN mission of 50 liaison officers was sent to supervise the 
ceasefire. Yet the mission soon expanded although the conditions 
were still not suitable (Lyman, 2004).  
In February 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
was created with a mandate to establish conditions of peace and 
security for the negotiation of a peaceful settlement. It did not include 
using force at first; the use of all necessary means was later 
authorized for the sole reason of protecting the delivery of 
humanitarian relief.  
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The mission was too ambitious, and was not designed to be a 
traditional peacekeeping mission, yet it lacked the mandate, and the 
means to act as more than such. It was slightly armed and not large 
enough to make any significant combat intervention (Lyman, 2004). 
In fact, and in order to be more specific, 12,000 lightly armed 
peacekeepers were deployed under UNPROFOR before the war broke 
out. Therefore, at the time, there was no clear mandate given for the 
mission as there was no peace agreement to keep or implement or a 
stalemate on the battlefield (Howard, 2008). 
The problems facing the UN’s intervention were many, one of which 
was the different points of view and perceptions that the major 
powers had about the history and reasons of the war, and accordingly 
the way to deal with it. For instance, the United States viewed the 
conflict as an ancient ethnic hatred leading to the conclusion that any 
intervention would be fruitless. Germany on the other hand, and most 
Europeans, saw the war as an aggression by Serbia in a bid to create 
greater Serbia.  Meanwhile China viewed the war as an internal 
matter and was against international intervention (Howard, 2008). 
However, the most influential stand was that of the Non-Alignment 
movement which supported UN’s use of force since it viewed the 
conflict as that of the Serb’s aggression.  
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Accordingly, the Non-Alignment movement supported a Security 
Council resolution to protect “safe areas”.  This was a response to the 
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1993, 
mainly because of the Bosnian Serb attacks on ‘isolated pockets’ in 
Bosnia where Srebrenica was one of the areas where thousands of 
Muslims were seeking refuge but were attacked by Serb forces 
leading to a death of 30 to 40 persons daily ("Former Yugoslavia-
UNPROFOR", 1996). Accordingly, the Security Council passed 
resolution 819 (1993) under Chapter VII and called all parties to 
consider Srebrenica and its surroundings as safe areas and 
accordingly to end any armed attacks and to withdraw the Bosnian 
Serb paramilitary units ("Former Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR", 1996). 
However, the mandate was still unclear and did not even specify the 
boundaries of the safe areas or the methods for demilitarization. The 
attacks of the Serbs continued, and several other resolutions were 
established, the third of which was sponsored by the United States, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and Spain. Although it included a 
mandate of preventing attacks and monitoring cease fire, it was not 
based on a formal report by the Secretary General (Howard, 2008). 
Here, the UN succumbed to the same mistake of taking decisions 
without proper consultation and coordination between the field, the 
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headquarters and the Secretary General, resulting in a weak 
resolution.  
The resolution, being under Chapter VII, authorized the mission to 
take necessary measures, including the use of force to protect the 
area, the UNPROFOR and the humanitarian convoys ("Former 
Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR", 1996). The Secretary General, however, 
expressed his reservation about UNPROFOR’s ability to stop the 
attacks while it lacks the sufficient numbers of peacekeepers. 
Ultimately, the Security Council decided to provide 35,000 troops to 
UNPROFOR to be able to carry out the mandate, but the vote resulted 
in providing 7500 instead (Howard, 2008).  
Their lack of commitment in so far as providing sufficient resources 
was an additional obstacle. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali had asked for 34,000 additional troops to undertake the 
protection of the “safe areas”;he received only 7,000 (Lyman, 2004). 
“The Security Council made decisions about the “safe areas” that were 
almost completely divorced from a vision of implementation” 
(Howard, 2008). The error was not limited to the design and 
formulation of the resolution and mandate, but even to the 
implementation on field. There were constant problems in the chain of 
command, and in the disorganization and miscommunication between 
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the commanders on the field and the UN headquarters, mainly the 
Secretary General. Additionally, there was a lack of integration and 
coordination between the UN forces on the ground and the Bosnian 
government. Both Osman and Lyman attribute the failure of 
UNPROFOR to the disagreement between the Security Council 
permanent members which paralyzed UNPROFOR: “In order to 
overcome the differences the Council had to compromise over the 
terms its resolutions and to sacrifice the clarity of the mandate of the 
UN forces. It is argued that ambiguity in the mission’s mandate 
caught UNPROFOR between peacekeeping and peace enforcement” 
(Osman, 2002). 
350 UNPROFOR personnel were kidnapped, and the mission failed to 
stop the massacre of Srebrenica. UN forces could not stand in the face 
of the Serbs troops and actually stepped aside in places like 
Srebrenica which was declared as a “safe area”. The suffering 
continued for years, accompanied by an international community 
increasingly confused on how to deal with the matter. The 
circumstances were difficult, with UNPROFOR essentially stuck in a 
massive ethnic war between half a dozen national ethnic groups (as 
cited in Osman, 2002). 
The Americans stepped into the scene, and in November 1995 Dayton 
Accords were signed by the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs under the 
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auspices of the United States which is believed to have given 
momentum to the peace process. By December 1995 the presence of 
the United Nations in Bosnia was formally replaced by a U.S. led 
NATO force and the UN slogan was removed from all of the equipment 
(helmets and vehicles). This represented the first instance of the UN 
handing over to member states a whole peace enforcement mission 
and mandate and not only the command of forces (Osman, 2002). 
 
	  
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Conclusion 
	  
Peacekeeping operations, though never mentioned in the Charter, 
have become a significant aspect and image of the United Nations. 
Massive efforts - politically, financially, legally and logistically, were 
invested to make the best of it. The efforts were not always 
successful; some mistakes were deadly and left scars on the 
organization until this day. Nevertheless, this didn’t hinder the 
concept of the peacekeeping operation from renewing, evolving, and 
adapting. 
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Many factors affected the evolution of peacekeeping operations, 
mainly the end of the cold war where new realities appeared: post 
Westphalian status, intrastate rather than interstate wars, influential 
non-state actors, and the end of the bipolar system that has 
paralyzed the organization for years. 
One of the reasons that peacekeeping operations fail is if the mandate 
itself sets objectives that cannot be achieved. In other words, “a 
mandate can suffer from being unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or 
too weak. Sometimes it is intentionally so. As Durch noted, 
“mandates tend to reflect the political play in the Security Council” 
(Jett, 2001). Consequently, Andrzej Sitkowski defines three crucial 
factors for an intervention to be effective: the relevance of the 
mandate to the actuality of the conflict, the speed of deployment, and 
the sufficiency of the means employed (Sitkowski, 2006).  
When it comes to the use of force, it is also governed by the mandate 
given to the operation by the Security Council. “The drafting of such 
mandates is an intensely political process, driven by various 
considerations that are not relevant to the use-of-force issue” 
(Findlay, 2002). In fact, one of Brahimi report’s recommendations was 
that there is a need to have a clear distinction between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement and that whenever peace enforcement is 
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decided to be the means, then the UN traditional peacekeeping “was 
the wrong vehicle” (Brahimi, 2000). 
Eventually, peace enforcement became a product of the new 
developments and the new realities imposed on the ground. 
Peacekeeping being the “passive” and peace enforcement involved 
using force beyond mere self-defense. This has created a set of new 
questions to be considered, on whether the UN is the appropriate 
organization to resort to these approaches, or whether it should 
remain as far away as possible from enforcing peace.  
The United Nations’ spirit does not comply with enforcing the peace 
but rather to keep, make, and build peace. Additionally, with peace 
enforcement, the organization’s impartiality will always be under 
question, not to mention that it lacks the means – political, logistical 
and financial, to go for peace enforcement on a full scale. Somalia’s 
and Bosnia’s experiences represent this fact. Accordingly, and as 
mentioned before, peacekeeping operations and more importantly 
peace enforcement operations are difficult to achieve, especially 
within a civil war context. The conviction remains that the 
international community performed better in peacekeeping between 
states than within them, but no one has tested this supposition 
(Fortna, 2003). 
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Since the circumstances requiring the creation of a peacekeeping 
operation are usually sudden and urgent, the practice was that the 
Security Council is instigated to resort to the Secretary General and 
the Secretariat to act rapidly in sending out the needed military 
personnel and military back up with little or no guidance from the 
appropriate political organs (Shimura, 2001). The case is no different 
when it comes to peace enforcement missions, therefore, Marrack 
Goulding has recommended a clear political commitment on the part 
of the Security Council towards the countries contributing troops, in 
that it [the Security Council] is determined to overcome and succeed 
against any opposition and has considered this a prerequisite for a 
successful peacekeeping operation (as cited in in Findlay, 2002). 
Though experience has shown that such commitment is very idealistic 
and difficult to attain; in Somalia and Bosnia the UN was not equipped 
to use the needed force, the U.S. took over using force and eventually 
withdrew. The use of force was not explicitly mentioned in the 
Security Council resolutions authorizing the mandates, which left it in 
a vague position and reflected a “non determination” of the Security 
Council to prevail against any opposition, the UN was put in critical 
situations at numerous instances.  
However, the non-readiness of the military troops to be deployed 
instantly remains an issue to be addressed by the Organization. In 
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order to solve it, Boutros Boutros Ghali established a “stand by 
arrangement system” where states provide a certain number of 
personnel to be on standby and ready to be dispatched in any future 
peacekeeping operation. However, contribution of states is voluntary, 
and they can even decide their contribution on a case by case basis. 
Initially, 70 states contributed a total of 100,000 personnel, but the 
system failed in its first test which was Rwanda in 1994 where all 
member states that had registered in the system turned down the 
Secretary General’s request for troops (Shimura, 2001). Although it 
should be noted here that Trygve Lie was the first Secretary General 
to suggest the idea of establishing a permanent peacekeeping force, 
“UN Guard” that was trained to use coercive measures if necessary 
(Nachmias, 1996). 
Moreover, since there is no mention of peacekeeping operations in the 
Charter, there is a lack of reference material for the UN, Security 
Council or member states.  This means that peacekeeping operations 
are always created from scratch and are dealt with on case-by-case 
basis depending on the circumstances surrounding each one. Bellamy 
supports this notion of dealing with peacekeeping operations on a 
case-by-case basis since it is an ad hoc technique that was in fact 
developed through dealing with individual problems.  Therefore it is a 
misconception to believe that all the peacekeeping cases during the 
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cold war were of Westphalian nature and all those post Cold War are 
of post Westphalian nature (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2004). 
Although, in 1992 a major development occurred when the 
department of peacekeeping operations known as (DPKO) was 
created to serve as a body that will follow up the creation and daily 
developments of peacekeeping operations. It included the Office of 
Operations, the Office of Planning and Support, and the 24-hour 
Situation Center. Although it expanded the civilian staff, and 50 
additional military officers were taken on loan from member states to 
be incorporated into the system, the DPKO suffered a shortcoming 
exemplified in the lack of expertise and adequate knowledge within 
the secretariat about the region or the country where the operation 
was to take place (Shimura, 2001).Moreover, the chain of command 
of the military advisors is vague and not clearly defined in the DPKO; 
the military officers are dispersed through the various divisions of the 
department, andit appeared in the 1990s that there are dual lines of 
responsibility to the military advisor and the Under Secretary General 
(O'Connor, 2001) which creates serious complications for 
peacekeeping missions, not to mention peace enforcement.  
It is equally important to think conceptually about the nature of the 
operation and the interrelation between concepts of peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, peace building and peacemaking (Bellamy, 
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Williams & Griffin, 2004) and An Agenda for Peace by Boutros 
BoutrosGhali.  
Yet, it should be kept in mind that for cases that clearly need peace 
enforcement, "coalition of the willing" may present a valid option. 
Such a coalition would be authorized by the UN but would be 
composed of those states with a sufficient interest and willingness to 
commit combat troops, to fund those troops, and to use force as 
necessary (Lyman, 2004). 
It is not claimed at any point that the United Nations as an 
international organization represents the perfection or idealism of 
what the international system is supposed to look like. 65 years after 
its establishment and the UN is still evolving, learning from mistakes, 
and adapting to surprising changes in the world order.  The concept of 
peacekeeping is no exception and is still facing challenges, some of 
which are out of the UN’s hands, while others are due to lack of 
willingness and miscalculations.  Boutros Boutros Ghali summarized 
these problems in the early 1990s to be related to the availability 
equipment and personnel, to the information capacity of the 
operations and to the command and control and lack of adequate 
equipment and training. The principle is that contributing countries 
send personnel and equipment, but on many occasions they send 
troops without the necessary equipment or the adequate training 
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needed. Therefore, in such cases the UN has to resort to purchasing 
equipment from other countries, which requires more time to get the 
peacekeepers trained with equipment that they are usually exposed to 
for the first time (Ghali, 1995). Language imposes another challenge 
to the peacekeepers, as simple and technical it may seem, but it can 
be crucial when a unit contains contingents of different nationalities 
and background which hinders their communication.   Furthermore, 
when the peacekeepers do not speak the local language and are thus 
unable to communicate with the local population, this also impairs the 
work of policing, administration and even intelligence (Yilmaz, 2005) 
Other challenges lie in the vagueness of the “script” for international 
peacekeepers; the studies, debates, and lessons, from past 
experiences show that there is no deficiency or shortage in experience 
and competence on the subject, but a lack in the political will for 
change (Sitkowski, 2006).  
Accordingly, reformation is still needed and should always be in 
progress. Most importantly, the Security Council should move beyond 
its current model of reactions and actually try to identify and address 
potential crises at their root before war and violence explode (Thakur 
and Schnabel, 2001). Kofi Annan noticed this in one of his statements 
when he stated that:	  “It is also necessary to recognize that any armed 
intervention is itself a result of the failure of prevention. As we 
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consider the future of intervention, we must redouble our efforts to 
enhance our preventive capabilities – including early warning, 
preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and preventive 
disarmament… Even the costliest policy of prevention is far cheaper, 
in lives and in resources, than the least expensive use of armed force” 
("Secretary General Presents his Annual Report", 1999). 
Nevertheless, when a violent conflict occurs, the UN, partly through 
peacekeeping operations should engage in post-conflict reconciliation 
and peace building through empowering the structures that will 
contribute to consolidating the peace (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). 
And, when planning a peacekeeping operation or a peace enforcement 
operation, it must take into account the worst case scenario of all 
possibilities, since one of the lessons learnt from past experiences in 
enforcement operations is that “the good faith of the parties cannot 
be taken for granted” (O'Connor, 2001). Therefore, it is suggested 
that the UN, when it comes to enforcing peace, could resort to 
regional arrangements and coalitions of the willing; the UN has 
learned that those types of interventions are better addressed by 
others. Recently, and in the wake of Somalia’s and Bosnia’s 
experiences, there has become a general agreement that peace 
enforcement missions should be given to military coalitions, supported 
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by the blessings of the UN, but not under its direct control (Jett, 
2001).  
 On a second level, when violence does break out, there is an urgent 
need to make the mandates and goals clear and to match this with 
military and financial resources. The divergence within the Security 
Council is often reflected in the ambiguity of the literature of the 
resolutions, which imposes a price that has to be paid by the 
peacekeepers on the field (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001). As well, 
there should of course be peace to keep in the first place. 
Moreover, although the idea of having a stand-by military structure to 
be dispatched rapidly in cases of emergencies was proposed on 
several occasions, the idea was opposed by many governments 
mostly on political grounds, fearing that this might give the United 
Nations sovereign powers (Urquhart, 2004). But Urquhart stresses 
that if the UN still intends to deal with practical emergencies in the 
world, then such arrangement is indispensable (O'Neil and Rees, 
2005). Robert Johansen suggests in this regard the creation of the 
above mentioned permanent UN force where individuals from many 
nations would volunteer to participate and would be individually 
recruited by the UN, assuming that it should be loyal to the UN and 
not to the variable and changeable political goals of their 
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governments who provide contingents ‘on loan’ for ad hoc forces 
(Johansen, 1990). 
Finally, the UN will continue to face the dilemma and conflict between 
the norm of respect for state sovereignty, and the demand for 
humanitarian intervention until one of them prevails, which will 
probably be the latter (Karns & Mingst, 2001). NGOs, regional 
organizations and coalitions will continue to have an increasing role, 
but the UN will, for better or for worse, remain the most widely 
acceptable international institution.  
Whether for peacekeeping or for peace enforcement, the process of 
trial and error is still in progress. Each corner hides a new challenge 
that the UN is committed to address, and to hopefully overcome. Yet, 
peacekeeping operations will always represent the core of the spirit of 
the United Nations. 
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Appendix I 
 
Resolution186 (1964) 
Adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 
The Security Council, 
Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten 
international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless 
additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a 
durable solution. 
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties 
signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,  
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "A11 Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under 
the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of 
action to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to 
endanger international peace;  
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the 
maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take a11 additional 
measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;  
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the 
utmost restraint:  
4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of 
Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition 
and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in 
consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the 
Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep 
the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically 
to the Security Council on its operation;  
5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be in the interest of 
preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent 
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a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance 
and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;  
6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three 
months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon 
by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the 
Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary 
contributions for the purpose;  
2. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement 
with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and 
United Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavors with the 
representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four 
Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an 
agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well- being of the 
people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. 
The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his 
efforts;  
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United 
Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator 
and his staff.  
Adopted unanimously at the I 102nd meeting. 
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Appendix IV 
 
The full text of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) reads as 
follows: 
“The Security Council, 
“Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 
425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 
(2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the 
situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 
(S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 
(S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 
2006 (S/PRST/2006/35), 
“Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of 
hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 
July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on 
both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of 
thousands of internally displaced persons, 
“Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time 
emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to 
the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted 
Israeli soldiers, 
“Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging 
the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners 
detained in Israel, 
“Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the 
commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to 
extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed 
forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the 
Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government 
of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is 
supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of 
operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate 
withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, 
“Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest, 
“Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan 
regarding the Shebaa farms area, 
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“Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon 
on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in 
South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to 
request the assistance of additional forces from UNIFIL as needed, to 
facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to 
restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material 
as needed to enable it to perform its duties, 
“Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and 
a long-term solution to the conflict, 
“Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, 
“1.   Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, 
the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate 
cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations; 
“2.   Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of 
Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces 
together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as 
that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon 
in parallel; 
“3.   Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the 
Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the 
provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the 
relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, 
so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of 
Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon; 
“4.   Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line; 
“5.   Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous 
relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as 
contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 
March 1949; 
“6.   Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to 
extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, 
including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under 
the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and 
harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to 
consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction 
and development of Lebanon; 
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“7.   Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action 
is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a 
long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including 
safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of 
displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility 
and to cooperate with the Security Council; 
 
“8.   Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire 
and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: 
-- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; 
-- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of 
hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the 
Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and 
weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of 
UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area; 
-- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif 
Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that 
require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, 
pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will 
be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the 
Lebanese State; 
-- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its 
Government; 
-- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon 
except as authorized by its Government; 
-- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land 
mines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession; 
“9.   Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as 
soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon 
and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term 
solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be 
actively involved; 
“10.  Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with 
relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to 
implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 
(2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the 
international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border 
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is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, 
and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days; 
“11.  Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in 
numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an 
increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, 
and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under 
resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): 
(a)   Monitor the cessation of hostilities; 
(b)   Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they 
deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel 
withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2; 
(c)   Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the 
Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; 
(d)   Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to 
civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; 
(e)   Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the 
establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8; 
(f)   Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement 
paragraph 14; 
“12.  Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon 
to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority 
throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in 
areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to 
ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any 
kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its 
duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United 
Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security 
and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian 
workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of 
Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; 
“13.  Requests the Secretary-General urgently to put in place 
measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in 
this resolution, urges Member States to consider making appropriate 
contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance 
from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have 
contributed to UNIFIL in the past; 
“14.  Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and 
other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of 
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arms or related materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 
to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request; 
“15.  Decides further that all States shall take the necessary 
measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using 
their flag vessels or aircraft: 
“(a)  The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms 
and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, 
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts 
for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and 
“(b)  The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any 
technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, 
maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; 
except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, 
training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by 
UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11; 
“16.  Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, 
and expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further 
enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the 
implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution; 
“17.  Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 
one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a 
regular basis; 
“18.  Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a 
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its 
relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 
1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 18 November 
2003; 
“19.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.” 
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